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Abstract 
The term empty creditor refers to a creditor who has obtained insurance against 
default, but who otherwise retains control rights in and outside bankruptcy. Several 
commentators have raised concerns that such creditors pose problems for private debt 
renegotiations and that they influence bankruptcy settlements. We analyze the problem 
empirically by studying a sample of 218 distressed debt restructurings in the U.S. between 
1995 and 2010. Our study shows that the existence of credit insurance does not significantly 
impact the choice between private renegotiation and bankruptcy, but that other factors play 
a more important role. In particular, a private workout is more likely to succeed when firms 
have higher going-concern values prior to their restructuring effort and if more of a firm’s 
debt is owed to banks and private lenders. Restructuring privately is less likely to succeed 
when more debt is public or owed to trade creditors, when leverage is high, and when there 
is greater information asymmetry between a firm and its creditors. We also present stock 
price evidence which suggests that the market treats private workouts more favorably than 
bankruptcy. This lends support to previous research which indicates that restructuring in 
bankruptcy is generally more costly than restructuring privately.  
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Preface 
The impact of credit insurance on creditors’ incentives in debt renegotiations is an 
issue that has received attention from the media, regulators, and practitioners over the past 
few years. Even so there exists little empirical work from which conclusions can be drawn. 
The need for such studies is present, especially because the issue may influence financial 
regulation of credit derivatives markets in the future.  
Our aim in this paper has been to empirically analyze the empty creditor problem for 
which there is a theoretical foundation, but which has not been systematically tested in 
previous research. This required us to engineer an empirical test based on observable firm 
characteristics, and to collect large amounts of data. In our case, the latter proved to be the 
most challenging due to the lack of disclosure in the over-the-counter (OTC) market. Ideally 
we wished to include credit default swaps (CDS) in our analysis as a continuous variable 
using notional outstanding volume. However, we recognized early on, by consulting industry 
practitioners and searching various databases, that historical records of notional volumes of 
CDS on single-name reference entities are not readily available. Nonetheless, this 
information is becoming more available as trading moves through centralized clearinghouses 
and information services companies, such as Markit, continue to collect trading data from 
several trading desks. Such advances offer the chance to improve on the analysis that we 
conduct in this paper in the future.  
As for our own contribution, the completion of this thesis would not have been 
possible without the feedback and support from Associate Professor Carsten Bienz, our 
thesis supervisor. We would also like to thank Halvor Hoddevik of Arctic Securities ASA for 
his expert advice and Stein Fossen for providing us with access to the Compustat and CRSP 
databases. We also extend our gratitude to Professor Lynn M. LoPucki, professor of law at 
the UCLA School of Law and visiting professor at Harvard Law School. Access to his 
Bankruptcy Research Database was an invaluable contribution to our empirical work.  
 
Bergen, 20 June 2010 
 
__________________________     __________________________ 
Nils Henrik Gjøstøl Aspeli         Kristoffer Riis Iden 
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1. Introduction 
One of the more significant innovations in finance in the past two decades is the 
development of credit derivatives, of which credit default swaps are the most common. The 
market for CDS contracts has grown exponentially and reached a peak in 2007 when the 
gross notional amount outstanding exceeded USD 60 trillion (Deutsche Bank, 2009). Until 
that time, the developments in the credit derivatives market was welcomed as an effective 
means to hedge credit risk. It was also thought to facilitate risk diversification on a broader 
scale, and even contribute to the soundness and stability of the financial system (Greenspan, 
2004). The onset of the financial crisis in 2007, however, pulled much of this praise into 
question. Warren Buffet, for instance, has labeled complex financial derivatives, like credit 
default swaps, as “financial weapons of mass destruction”. There has also been genuine 
concern that the interconnectedness and opacity of the CDS market hides risk and may 
threaten the system at times of stress (ECB, 2009). 
The criticism aimed at credit derivatives has also been extended to other areas of 
finance. One much-debated issue is related to the impact that the CDS market may have on 
the debtor-creditor relationship, particularly in the instance of corporate financial distress. 
The debate is grounded in the very principles that derivates are built upon, namely the 
decomposition and transfer of different types of risk. These transfer mechanisms, it is 
argued, can have negative side-effects for the incentives of creditors to act in the best 
interest of the firms in which they have a stake. At the heart of the issue lies the fact that 
credit insurance not only allows the buyer to transfer credit risk to the seller, but can also 
cause separation between a creditor’s control rights and cash flow rights.   
The terminology to describe the problem has been developed by legal scholars Henry 
Hu and Bernard Black in their work on equity and debt decoupling (Hu and Black, 2008a; 
2008b). In their words, ownership of debt can be viewed as a package of economic rights to 
receive payment of principal and interest, and contractual and legal rights, like enforcing the 
terms of a debt contract and to participate in bankruptcy proceedings (Hu and Black, 2008b). 
Credit derivatives allow a creditor to decouple his economic rights from his legal rights. In 
other words, while the CDS contract provides insurance against losses from default, control 
rights are retained through ownership of the underlying debt contract. The result may be an 
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empty creditor whose incentives may be skewed compared to how creditors are traditionally 
viewed by law and contracting practice. Taken to its length, the empty creditor hypothesis 
undermines the assumption that creditors will strive to keep a solvent firm out of 
bankruptcy and that they will maximize the value of an insolvent firm.   
The notion of empty creditors has received widespread attention from the media, 
academia and practitioners. Investor George Soros, for example, linked the AbitibiBowater 
and General Motors bankruptcies to the fact that some bondholders owned CDS and stood 
to gain more by bankruptcy than by reorganization (Soros, 2009). The Economist recently 
argued in an article that the availability of credit default swaps has undermined the premise 
that “creditors always attempt to keep solvent firms out of bankruptcy” (Economist, 2009).  
Furthermore, the topic spurred a reaction from the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) that published a research note in 2009 attempting to dispel many of the 
arguments underlying the empty creditor hypothesis (Mengle, 2009).  
Yet there exists little empirical evidence either in favor or against the hypothesis. Hu 
and Black present some examples of potential instances where empty creditors have played 
a part, but they admit that their evidence is based on “possibilities, rumors, practitioner 
articles (which often don’t name instances) and conversations with bankruptcy lawyers, 
bankruptcy judges, and other knowledgeable market participants” (Hu and Black, 2008). 
Mengle (2009) cites the proportional number of out-of-court restructurings and 
bankruptcies before and after the boom of the CDS market as evidence against the empty 
creditor hypothesis, but omits any other factors that may explain the results. The empty 
creditor hypothesis has also been studied using an analytical model. Bolton and Oehmke 
(2010) develop a formal economic model, by comparing contracting outcomes with and 
without CDS, and predict that the CDS market may serve to strengthen creditors’ bargaining 
power ex ante which raises the debtor’s pledgeable income and helps reduce the incidence 
of strategic default. The commitment role of CDS has also been explored in other papers that 
mostly focus on the impact of CDS on bank’s incentives to monitor, or on the ability of CDS 
to improve risk sharing. Duffie and Zhou (2001), for instance, show that CDS allows for the 
decomposition of credit risk into components that may help banks overcome a potential 
lemons problem when hedging credit risk. Similarly, Arping (2004) argues that CDS can help 
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reduce a problem with moral hazard between banks and borrowers, provided that CDS 
contracts expire before maturity.  
In this paper we analyze the empty creditor problem from an ex post perspective. As 
we will argue later, one implication of the empty creditor hypothesis is that hedged creditors 
are less likely to approve an out-of-court restructuring than unhedged creditors. 
Nonetheless, the choice between a private workout and formal bankruptcy proceedings 
depends on several factors, including the complexity of a firm’s capital structure, asset 
tangibility and outstanding liabilities. Therefore, a full analysis of the relationship between 
the likelihood of an out-of-court restructuring and hedging with credit default swaps needs 
to control for these other factors. In order to complete such an analysis we study a sample of 
218 distressed debt restructuring attempts in the United States between 1995 and 2010. 
Our sampling methodology follows Gilson et al. (1990) and identifies financially distressed 
firms by their poor stock price performance. Incidences of bankruptcy are supplemented to 
the sample and drawn from the LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (2010). In our 
sample, 86 companies successfully restructure their debt out of court, while 132 firms file for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. We provide detailed summary statistics of both subsamples and 
present univariate and multivariate analyses that shed light on what determines a firm’s 
choice between bankruptcy and restructuring privately.  
Our findings suggest that financial distress is more likely to be resolved privately 
when firms have higher going-concern values prior to their restructuring efforts and if more 
debt is owed to banks and private lenders. A private restructuring is less likely to succeed 
when more debt is owed to public lenders and trade creditors, when the firm is highly 
leveraged and when there is greater information asymmetry between a firm and its 
creditors. Even after all these results are incorporated in our models, we find no evidence 
that the presence of credit default swaps on a firm’s debt influences the choice between 
bankruptcy and private renegotiation.  
Our study falls in the category of literature that examines corporate financial distress 
from an ex post perspective. While no other empirical studies, to our knowledge, have 
addressed the impact of credit default swaps on the choice between a private workout and 
formal bankruptcy, related evidence has been generated. Gilson et al. (1990) study a sample 
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of financially distressed firms during 1978-1987 that are forced to restructure their debt. 
They find that financial distress is more likely to be resolved through private renegotiation 
when more of the firm’s assets are intangible and relatively more debt is owed to banks, and 
less likely to succeed when there are more distinct classes of debt outstanding. Jostarndt & 
Sautner (2007) perform a similar study under the non-interventionalist German bankruptcy 
code, and find that private restructurings are more likely to succeed for a firm that is higher 
leveraged, owe more debt to banks, and exhibit higher going-concern values. These findings 
are in line with James (1995) who finds that banks are more likely to forgive principle and 
swap debt for equity if less outstanding debt is owed to public lenders. Similarly, Asquith, 
Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) find, through a study of distressed high-yield bond issuers, 
that successful private workouts are impeded by coordination problems between private 
and public creditors.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the 
theoretical basis for the empirical study that follows. We give a brief introduction to credit 
default swaps and their role as hedging instruments before elaborating further on debt 
decoupling and its implications for debt governance. We also discuss firms’ incentives to 
choose between private renegotiation and bankruptcy as alternative mechanisms for dealing 
with financial distress. Section 3 presents our hypotheses and the empirical proxies for our 
sample that we derive on the basis of the theoretical discussion. Section 4 describes the data 
and sampling method. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis and results. Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Credit default swaps, empty creditors and the economics of 
bankruptcy 
2.1 Credit default swaps explained  
The empty creditor hypothesis is built upon the assumption that a creditor is able to 
completely separate legal ownership of corporate debt from the economic risk associated 
with holding that debt. Credit derivatives that strip out credit risk from underlying debt 
securities can be used for just such a purpose. The most important and widespread credit 
derivative in use today is credit default swaps. 
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Simply stated, a credit default swap is a swap contract where the swap seller agrees 
to pay the swap buyer some given amount in the event of a default of some third party, or 
what is often referred to as the reference entity. In return, the swap buyer agrees to make 
periodic payments to the swap seller. These payments are usually referred to as the spread, 
or premium, and are typically expressed in basis points per annum (J.P. Morgan, 1999). The 
swap contract is structured such that the present value of the swap is zero at the time of 
agreement, which means that the expected present value of the buyer’s periodic spread 
payments equals the expected present value of the seller’s payment upon default. This 
implies that the spread paid by the swap buyer effectively functions as a market-based 
probability measure of the default risk of the reference entity. 
Illustration 1: CDS contract  
 
Source: J.P. Morgan (1999) 
 
In basic terms, a CDS can be seen as linear combinations of simpler, more 
standardized financial contracts. Using an arbitrage argument we can replicate a long 
position in a CDS by taking a short position in the risky credit issued by the reference entity 
and a long position in a risk-free bond paying a floating interest rate with the same maturity 
(Duffie, 1999). We assume the risky credit pays a floating interest with a spread   over the 
risk-free bond. If a credit event takes place, as shown in Illustration 2 at time τ, the position 
is closed by buying back the reference credit and at the same time selling the risk-free 
floater. We see that this trade perfectly replicates the payoff of a CDS contract that 
references the risky credit, and that the spread   must equal the credit spread paid by the 
protection buyer in the CDS agreement.1  
 
                                                     
1
In practice this arbitrage argument is somewhat modified due to technical factors like reverse repo special rates and 
transaction costs. 
Protection buyer
Credit spread payment (bps)
Contingent payment 
(triggered  by credit event)
Reference entity
Protection seller
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Illustration 2: Components of a CDS  
 
Source: Duffie (1999) 
 
CDS contracts can, in principle, reference any type of credit or debt security, but are 
in broad terms often classified into three different groups (ECB, 2009). The first group 
consists of contracts that offer protection to the credit risk of a single corporate, 
government or sovereign entity. These contracts are often referred to as single-name CDS 
contracts. Secondly, there exist CDS contracts that reference indices consisting of a pool of 
several single-name CDSs. CDS indices have gained popularity in recent years, and may be 
used as a measure of credit risk in the broader economy or of sovereign states. Well known 
examples are indices like iTraxx, which tracks corporate bonds, and SovX, which tracks 
sovereign bonds. Thirdly, basket CDSs reference a portfolio of several entities and typically 
contain some sort of tailored trigger mechanism.2 Additionally, there exist CDS contracts 
traded on non-public debt or loans, or what are often referred to as a Loan Credit Default 
Swaps (LCDSs), as well as other more specialized contracts. 
The developments in the CDS market have changed the face of credit trading and 
have had wider repercussions for the financial markets, of which we choose to highlight 
three of the more important issues. Firstly, it has been argued by many that credit 
derivatives markets have induced efficiency benefits by enabling a better allocation and 
pricing of credit risk in the economy. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
pointed to the CDS market’s ability to enhance the price discovery mechanism through “the 
collective knowledge held by market participants” (Greenspan, 2002). This observation is 
                                                     
2
A basket CDS is often triggered by the nth-to-default in the reference basket (e.g. 1st-to-default, 2nd-to-default) 
Rf
τ
Long Risk-Free Floating Bond
Rf +S
Short Par Defaultable Credit 
τ
Credit Default SwapPar value = 100
Recovery value = Y(τ )
Settlement = 100 - Y(τ )
Credit spread payments (S)
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supported by Blanco et al. (2005), who find evidence that CDS spreads lead the spreads in 
the associated cash bond market for corporate issuers, which indicates that CDS spreads are 
a better measure of credit risk. However, whether this increased liquidity is to the benefit of 
corporate borrowers is questioned by Ashcraft and Santos (2009), who fails to find evidence 
that the onset of CDS trading have lowered the borrowing cost for the average corporate 
borrower. 
Secondly, critics of credit default swaps maintain that the instruments pose a threat 
to financial stability. Much of the concern is that too much risk is concentrated at a limited 
number of dealers and underwriters that are “too-big-to-fail”. Counterparty risk is also hard 
to assess because the CDS market is interconnected and inherently non-transparent. It is 
feared that this combination increases the strain on the financial system in times of stress 
(ECB, 2009). The growth of credit derivatives markets also enables large amounts of financial 
leverage to be hidden outside regulated financial institutions in the so-called shadow 
banking system. This was arguably an important factor behind the credit bubble and the 
ensuing financial crisis (Krugman, 2009). Measures to tackle these potential problems have 
therefore been proposed. Some suggestions are to bring CDS trading onto public exchanges 
or to introduce a central clearinghouse to reduce counterparty risk. Other proposals aim to 
bring more transparency to the market.3 New financial regulations, for example in the form 
of Basel III, should also be expected to take a more conservative view on credit derivatives 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2010). 
Finally, the emergence of CDS contracts has changed important aspects of the 
debtor-creditor relationship. In essence, CDS contracts enable the decomposition and 
transfer of the credit risk of the underlying reference entity (Hull, 2008). As a result, the risk 
and cash flows of a security can be completely separated from physical ownership of that 
security. This aspect of CDS contracts can impact traditional debtor-creditor relationships as 
a creditor may hold the contractual rights associated with ownership without having any 
economic interest in the owned asset. It is this decoupling phenomenon that forms the basis 
for the empty creditor hypothesis.     
                                                     
3
 Some of these proposals have already been implemented. For example, the North American and European conventions 
have been changed to allow CDS contracts to pay the spread upfront in the initial trade, and later pay standardized coupons 
of sizes 100 bps or 500 bps (Markit, 2009). Prior conventions entailed a payment of the credit spread during the entire life 
of the contract which made each single trade unique. Ad hoc measures aimed at reducing gross outstanding notional 
through trade compression have also been implemented (Deutsche Bank, 2009) 
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2.2 Debt decoupling and the empty creditor hypothesis 
The framework to describe empty creditors was developed by legal scholars Henry 
Hu and Bernard Black who drew attention to how credit derivatives affect the incentives of 
bondholders and other market participants. They apply the unbundling principle inherent in 
financial derivatives to a firm’s capital structure and describe the separation of economic 
entitlements from ownership rights for equity and debt. Hu and Black’s (2008a; 2008b) 
primary focus is to point out how the current legal statutes inadequately capture the 
development in derivatives markets, which leads them to explore the possible implications 
of financial decoupling. Recently, finance scholars Patrick Bolton and Martin Oehmke have 
developed a model using insight from traditional financial contracting literature that in many 
ways formalizes the implications that Hu and Black (2008a; 2008b) have explored (Bolton 
and Oehmke, 2010). In the following we explain the empty creditor hypothesis building on 
both sets of approaches. 
a) Empty creditors and their implications for debt renegotiations  
Initially Hu and Black (2008a) focused their work on equity decoupling and lapses in 
the regulation for corporate control and corporate governance. Rules governing public firms 
generally assume that share ownership translates into certain ownership rights. Their nature 
can be economic in the form of dividend, liquidation or appraisal rights. Or they can be legal 
rights to vote, uphold fiduciary duties, bring suits against the company, inspect corporate 
records and so on (Hu and Black, 2008a). However, derivatives, such as options, futures and 
equity swaps, and the widespread market for share lending, now offer low-cost and effective 
ways to separate economic ownership from voting ownership. Through ownership 
combinations of the underlying shares and a coupled asset, shareholders can build up 
greater voting rights than economic ownership, or what Hu and Black (2008a) call empty 
voting. Oppositely, hidden (morphable) ownership refers to a situation where investors have 
greater economic ownership than formal voting rights. 
Hu and Black (2008a) argue that empty voting and hidden ownership can lead to 
unwanted market behavior. Actual voting positions can be concealed from public scrutiny 
and mandatory bid rules can be circumvented. Decoupling ownership rights from economic 
obligations can also lead to distorted behavior on the part of shareholders who may choose 
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to disregard their fiduciary duties or even act against the interests of the firm. Such behavior 
has attracted the attention of regulators and court rulings have already set precedence to 
curtail the use of derivatives and share lending contracts to create hidden ownership 
positions.4 There is also a trend towards greater disclosure requirements of equity swaps 
and other cash-settled equity derivatives. Hu and Black (2008b) argue that such disclosure 
requirements should also be extended to credit derivatives, including credit default swaps. 
Although the discussion on debt decoupling is more recent and less developed than 
the one for equity decoupling, the same basic principles can be applied to debt contracts as 
to equity securities. A debt contract entitles the owner to contractual rights to receive 
interest payments and principal, default rights and voting rights to waive financial covenants 
or to enforce bankruptcy upon a non-compliant debtor. In bankruptcy a creditor’s rights 
extends to voting for a liquidation or reorganization plan, or assuming control of a distressed 
entity. Just as shareholders can hedge their economic exposure with equity derivatives, 
bondholders can insure against default risk using credit derivatives. An empty creditor 
resembles an empty voter as a creditor that has traded away all economic risk, but retains 
other contractual and voting rights. As for hidden ownership, non-disclosure is the norm as 
bondholders are seldom required to reveal their positions (Hu and Black, 2008b). 
 Hu and Black put forth several suggestions for how debt decoupling can have 
negative implications for the relationship between creditors and debtors and they use credit 
default swaps to illustrate their examples. By holding CDS contracts, creditors can fully 
hedge their positions, but still retain contractual rights and full voting rights within 
bankruptcy. Pushing the point further, Hu and Black (2008b) argue that creditors can build 
up negative economic ownership in a firm, implying that the value of their overall position 
increases with credit risk or if a credit event occurs: “An investor might, for example, hold 
USD 200 million of a company’s bonds, but have bought credit protection on USD 500 million 
notional amount of bonds” (Hu and Black, 2008b). The authors postulate that the incentive 
problems of hedged creditors can take place both out of and within bankruptcy. A creditor 
with zero or negative economic interest in a firm may prefer that a company fail, and may 
therefore oppose an out-of-court restructuring in order to trigger the contractual payoff on 
the credit default swaps. Within bankruptcy, hedged creditors do not have any interest in 
                                                     
4
 See CSX v Children’s Investment Fund (June 2008) 
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maximizing the value of the firm and may as a result vote for less efficient decisions on 
liquidation versus continuation, or on post-reorganization capital structures (Hu and Black, 
2008b).  
 Finally, Hu and Black (2008b) argue that widespread debt decoupling can contribute 
to systemic financial risk. Firstly, debt decoupling complicates renegotiation of debt 
contracts, which on a large scale poses systemic risk as debtors are unable to resolve 
defaults privately with lenders. Secondly, decoupling can reduce the incentives of lenders to 
monitor and assess credit risk correctly – a matter that is complicated by securitization and 
longer ownership chains. Third, debt decoupling can exacerbate liquidity shocks by making it 
difficult to readily identify counterparties in a transaction. The wide distribution of credit risk 
impedes a collaborative effort by regulators and market participants to address a liquidity 
crisis. In addition, the rigidity of the debtor-creditor relationship caused by debt decoupling 
means that liquidity in the form of refinancing as a substitute to renegotiation will tend to 
dry up in a downturn, when it is needed the most (Hu and Black, 2008b). 
b) Economic model of empty creditors 
Hu and Black (2008a; 2008b) primarily study the empty creditor problem from an ex 
post perspective and describe what implications empty creditors can have for debt 
renegotiations. Bolton and Oehmke (2010) build on these insights as they set out to analyze 
the empty creditor problem using a more formal economic model. Their model, however, 
also incorporates a view of the ex ante effects that the existence of credit protection can 
have on the debtor-creditor relationship. 
Bolton and Oehmke (2010) analyze a firm that is considering a positive net present 
value (NPV) project that can be financed by issuing debt. The authors assume that the firm 
faces a limited commitment problem, a problem that has been thoroughly discussed in 
previous literature, for example by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Hart and Moore 
(1998). Under the assumption of limited commitment the firm can issue debt to external 
investors, but has no way to credibly commit to paying out cash flows from the investment 
project in the future.  
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The model presented by Bolton and Oehmke (2010) posits that defaults can happen 
for two reasons. Firstly, default can happen from a lack of liquidity, when the firm is unable 
to honor the cash payment obligation written in the debt contract due to insufficient 
available funds at some interim point in time. Secondly, defaults can happen for strategic 
reasons, when the firm diverts cash flow away and refuses to pay the debtor – even if the 
firm’s cash flows were sufficient to cover the payment obligations. Using this relatively 
simple economic framework Bolton and Oehmke (2010) are able to analyze consequences 
that CDS contracts have on debt contracting outcomes both from an ex ante and ex post 
perspective, and reach conclusions that in some ways diverge from the views presented by 
Hu and Black (2008a; 2008b). 
Outcome without CDS contracts 
First, Bolton and Oehmke (2010) assume that the firm has no CDS contracts traded 
on its debt and that the firm is considering an investment project requiring an initial 
investment outlay of   at Date 0. The project generates cash flows over two discrete time 
periods, Date 1 and Date 2. The cash flows are assumed to be stochastic with two possible 
outcomes in each time period. In particular, we let    
    
   and    
    
  , with   
    
  
and   
    
 , represent the two sets of cash flow realizations, with   and   as the 
associated high cash flow probability at Date 1 and Date 2, respectively. Next, we assume 
that the firm has no equity, meaning that the initial investment will have to be fully debt 
financed. If the firm is able to obtain debt financing, the contract specifies a payment of the 
face value   at Date 1. We also assume that   
     , thus implying that the debt must 
be risky. If the firm defaults on the contractual payment   at Date 1 the creditors have the 
right to force the firm into bankruptcy. Otherwise, the project is allowed to continue and the 
firm can collect the Date-2 payments.  
The main insights of the model arise from the assumption of limited commitment, 
which is implemented by only making the   
  cash flow verifiable by outside investors. This 
means that any amount higher than the low Date-1 cash flow can be diverted away from the 
investor. In particular, it will be possible for the firm to divert the amount   
    
  away 
from the creditors by defaulting strategically in outcomes where the project in fact has 
realized   
 . Moreover, we assume that the Date-2 cash flows cannot be contracted at Date 
0, but that the outcome is realized to the firm at Date 1, and that this cash flow can be made 
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verifiable to the creditors at Date 1 by paying a verification cost of        , with        . 
This latter assumption opens for the possibility of debt renegotiations by enabling the firm 
to pledge some portion of the Date-2 cash flow to the lender following a default at Date 1. In 
order for the firm to repay the contractual amount   in the high cash flow state we 
therefore have that the following incentive constraint must be satisfied: 
  
          
                (1) 
The constraint tells us that the firm will repay the debt at Date 1 when the value of 
complying with the contractual agreement, as given by the left hand side (LHS), is larger than 
the value of defaulting strategically. The latter choice, as given by the right hand side (RHS), 
entails a renegotiation of the debt where the debtor is given a fraction   of the Date-2 cash 
flow with an associated verification cost ( ). Solving Equation (1) for  , we thus see that the 
maximum face value ( ) that satisfies the incentive constraint under both Date-2 cash flow 
realizations is given by the following equation: 
      
                 (2) 
Furthermore, by assuming that the firm will always be able to honor this incentive 
compatible repayment in the high cash flow state at Date 1 – that is, given that   
  
   
             – we get the following maximum ex ante investment outlay that satisfies 
the incentive constraint: 
       
                        
         
    (3) 
 Given that the incentive constraint expressed by Equation (1) holds and that the 
investment does not exceed   , strategic defaults will not happen in equilibrium, and all 
defaults that happen for liquidity reasons will be perfectly efficient. If the investment outlay 
exceeds   , however, the project can either by financed with strategic defaults happening in 
equilibrium, or the firm may not be able to raise debt financing at all.  
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The first case is shown to arise in the interval given by          . That is, the project can 
be financed with debt with strategic default in equilibrium given that the probability of a 
high cash flow at Date 2 satisfies the following condition: 
     
       
 
       
       
    
  
      (4) 
 This assumption yields the following maximum face value and associated maximum 
ex ante investment outlay consistent with the incentive constraint: 
      
                 (5) 
         
                    
               
         
    (6) 
The second case, where no financing can be obtained at all, arises when the 
investment outlay exceeds the maximum of    and   . This happens since the firm will now 
choose to default strategically in both Date-1 states.  
In conclusion, we note how two types of inefficiencies arise from the contracting 
outcomes outlined above. Firstly, inefficiencies arise as an effect of the firm defaulting 
strategically in the low cash flow state at Date 1 (  
 ) in the case of investment outlay 
         and probability    . Secondly, inefficiencies arise from underinvestment in 
the case where             , since the firm will not be able to attract financing to the 
project even though it is NPV positive. The three possible contracting outcomes without CDS 
contracts are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Contracting outcomes without CDS protection 
Investment ( )                            
Financing possible? YES, for all  
YES, for     
(with strategic default) 
NO 
Maximum face value ( )      
                  
             n/a 
 
Source: Bolton and Oehmke (2010) 
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Outcome with CDS contracts 
Next, we extend the model by introducing the option for the lender to buy credit 
protection by entering into a CDS position of size  . The existence of CDS contracts imply 
that the borrower must compensate the lender to a larger degree in a debt renegotiation 
than without, since the CDS contracts reduce the lender’s loss from a default by the amount 
of credit protection. Given that the amount of credit insurance   exceeds     , we have a 
new incentive constraint given by the following equation:   
  
          
                       (7) 
By comparing Equation (1) and Equation (7) we can easily see how CDS contracts 
function as a commitment device. We see that the RHS of Equation (7) is strictly smaller than 
the RHS of Equation (1), and we therefore have that the firm’s incentive to default 
strategically must be reduced. It can also easily be shown that setting the level of credit 
protection equal to      
  will lead to an unambiguous efficiency increase, since the 
project’s ability to attract debt financing is increased without sacrificing any renegotiation 
surplus (Bolton and Oehmke, 2010). At this level of credit protection, the maximum face 
value with no strategic default consistent with the incentive constraint given by Equation (7) 
is equal to     
 . The associated maximum investment outlay is given by:  
            
                
     
           
                        (8) 
Equivalent to the case without CDS presented earlier, contracting is also possible with 
strategic default in equilibrium for an interval           , for Date-2 high cash-flow probabilities 
given by: 
     
       
 
  
     
       (9) 
In this case the maximum incentive compatible face value is equal to     
  with 
associated maximum investment outlay given by: 
                 
          
                 
     
           
         (10) 
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Table 2: Contracting outcomes with CDS protection  
Investment ( )                              
Financing possible? YES, for all  YES, for    NO 
Maximum face value ( )     
      
  n/a 
Outcome compared to no 
CDS protection 
       
(strategic defaults 
reduced) 
        
(underinvestment 
reduced)  
                       
(underinvestment 
reduced) 
 
Source: Bolton and Oehmke (2010) 
 
We thus have two positive efficiency effects from CDS contracts at this level of 
protection. Firstly, CDS contracts increase the level of initial investment outlays that can be 
financed without strategic default happening, since      . Secondly, the existence of CDS 
contracts will attract financing for projects with strategic default in equilibrium that 
previously were unable raise capital, since                      . In this model setup, 
the introduction of a CDS market thus decreases the incidence of strategic default and 
increases the set of companies that can receive financing.  
Next, consider what happens when credit protection is raised above the level given 
by      
 . It can then be shown that renegotiations following liquidity defaults in some 
cases will no longer be possible. The lenders have become empty creditors. To see the 
effect, consider the case where the firm is renegotiating the debt at Date 1 for liquidity 
reasons when the expected Date-2 cash flow is   
 . In this case, a successful renegotiation of 
the contract is no longer possible, since      
 . That is, the creditor’s payoff on the CDS 
contract ( ) triggered by the default of the reference entity is larger than the maximum cash 
flow the firm can pledge (   
 ), and a successful debt renegotiation is therefore impossible.   
But although credit protection with      
  can derail debt renegotiations that in 
themselves would have been ex post efficient, the outcome does not necessarily need to be 
ex ante inefficient. This is the case when the increased commitment enables projects to 
obtain financing that otherwise would remain unfinanced, and when the gain from fewer 
strategic defaults more than outweighs the loss associated with inefficient liquidity default 
renegotiations.  
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To see this, first consider the former case, which arises when       . From Table 2 
we see that this implies that the last project to receive financing under low credit 
protection,      
 , will be financed efficiently without strategic default in equilibrium. It 
will therefore be efficient to raise the level of credit protection to      
  for projects that 
would otherwise not have been financed. That is, in the case where        it may be 
efficient to raise credit protection to a level of       
  for projects with     . The high 
level of credit protection will thus enable these projects to receive financing – albeit with 
strategic default in equilibrium. Secondly, consider the latter case when       . From Table 
2 we see that the marginal project is financed with strategic default in equilibrium under low 
credit protection (     
 ). Given that the cost associated with lost renegotiation surplus is 
more than outweighed by the efficiency gains from reduced strategic defaults it will be 
efficient to set the credit protection to a high level       
 ) for projects with       . This 
can be shown to be the case whenever    .  
In conclusion the model predicts an unambiguous efficiency gain from introducing 
credit protection at a low level (     
 ), since this level of credit protection decreases the 
incentive for firms to default strategically, and decreases the level of underinvestment 
without skewing creditors’ incentives in beneficial renegotiations following liquidity defaults. 
Moreover, the model also predicts that for some cases it may also be efficient to raise credit 
protection to      
 . In particular, it is efficient to set protection to a high level for 
investment projects that would otherwise be unable to obtain financing, and in cases where 
the efficiency gains from reduced strategic defaults more than outweighs the loss of 
renegotiation surplus.  
Creditor’s choice of credit protection 
Next, we consider what level of credit protection the lender will choose compared to 
the efficient contracting outcome outlined above. In the model by Bolton and Oemhke 
(2010) creditors are assumed to choose their level of credit protection after the terms of the 
firm’s debt contract are determined. The creditors thus take the debt face value   as given. 
The level of credit protection is also assumed to be non-committable, meaning that the 
lender can choose to change his level of protection after the initial level of protection is set. 
The authors argue that the lender’s inability to commit to a given level of credit protection is 
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reasonable given the low level of disclosure in the credit derivatives market. The opacity of 
the CDS market makes it unlikely that the firm knows whether the lender holds credit 
protection on its debt – and even less likely that it knows whether the level of protection has 
changed. Moreover, the insurance premium   paid by the creditor is assumed to be fairly 
priced, meaning that the market for CDSs correctly anticipates the creditors’ renegotiation 
incentives for a given level of insurance  . The creditor is then assumed to evaluate different 
levels of credit protection ex ante. Trivially, we have that it must be optimal for the creditor 
to set the level of credit protection to      
  since this strengthens his position in a 
renegotiation without reducing any renegotiation surplus. However, it can be shown that the 
creditor may increase the level above      
  as long as his expected payoff increases, 
overall efficiency notwithstanding. 
 Firstly, in the case where the marginal project can be financed without strategic 
default under low credit protection (     
 ), that is, when     , the creditor is shown to 
choose high credit protection (     
 ) under the following condition (Bolton and Oehmke, 
2010):  
  
   
   
      
  
          
    
 
 
 
  
           
      (11) 
Secondly, there also exists an interval           , where financing with low credit 
protection (     
 ) is possible with strategic default in equilibrium, where the creditors 
will choose high credit protection (     
 ) when condition (11) holds and    . We thus 
see that inefficient, over-insured empty creditors arise from the model setup when the 
project’s probability of a high Date-2 cash flow is high, and when the verification cost is low 
compared to the probability of a high Date-1 cash flow (   ). 
In conclusion, Bolton and Oehmke (2010) predict the following effects on the debtor-
creditor relationship from the introduction of CDS contracts. Firstly, CDS contracts are shown 
to function as a commitment device which increases efficiency by reducing strategic defaults 
and increase the set of projects which can obtain financing. Credit protection may in the 
case of some investment projects create empty creditors, but these contracting outcomes 
are still ex ante efficient since financing is made available to more companies. This 
conclusion diverges from Hu and Black (2008b) who posits that the existence of empty 
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creditors may create inefficiencies per se. Secondly, Bolton and Oehmke (2010) predict that 
creditors may in some cases over-insure, creating inefficient empty creditors. Using the 
insights from the model framework the authors go on to describe possible measures to 
curtail the problem, including denying empty creditors voting rights in bankruptcy 
proceedings and making non-binding out-of-court restructurings a credit event. The authors 
express concern over such measures by arguing that they would not only eliminate the 
inefficiencies that arise from possible empty creditor problems, but would also eliminate the 
efficiency gains associated with the CDS contracts function as a commitment device. Finally 
the authors prescribe increased disclosure of creditors’ CDS positions, both in bankruptcy 
proceedings and in day-to-day trading of credit derivatives, as a measure that would 
increase creditors’ commitment to a given level of credit protection and reduce the incentive 
to over-insure.  
c) Evidence of the empty creditor hypothesis 
Hu and Black (2008b) initially formulated the empty creditor hypothesis, and Bolton 
and Oehmke (2010) have formalized its impact on the debtor-creditor relationship. But do 
we observe empty creditors in practice? Due to the low disclosure of debt ownership and 
hedging positions, concrete evidence of empty creditors is sparse. However, a study of the 
characteristics of the credit derivatives market should at least warrant the possibility of their 
existence.  
The first indication is the sheer size of the CDS market. According to the ISDA, the 
CDS market grew from USD 631 billion notional outstanding in 2001 to over USD 62 trillion 
notional outstanding at its peak in late 2007, before settling to a level of just over USD 32 
trillion in 2009. Part of the reason for this growth is that CDS contracts can be traded 
independently of the underlying debt securities, allowing the CDS market to grow to a 
multiple of the underlying debt market. This, in turn, opens for the possibility that creditors 
can fully hedge their debt exposure and even build up negative economic ownership by 
over-hedging.  
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Graph 1: Gross notional outstanding  
 
The number of gross notional outstanding CDS contracts shown above is based on estimates. The BIS (Bank for 
International Settlements) collects data from central banks on a semi-annual basis. Each central bank collects 
data voluntarily reported by banks and dealers in its jurisdiction and calculates aggregate national data, which 
the BIS then compile. The ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association) publishes a semi-annual 
market survey, which includes notional amounts of CDS bought and sold, based on voluntary responses from 60 
institutions.  
 
Source: BIS and ISDA  
 
Evidence is also found by looking at the major CDS market participants. After credit 
default swaps were pioneered by J.P. Morgan in the mid-90s, commercial banks have been 
among their biggest users. One of the reasons is that the CDS market has enabled banks and 
other types of lenders to hedge credit risk associated with specific exposures in ways that 
were not previously possible. In practice, because CDS contracts strip out specific risk from 
an underlying security, and can be traded without the reference entity’s knowledge or 
consent, CDS hedging allow banks to shift credit risk off their balance sheets without selling 
the loans outright and damaging client relationships in the process (BoE, 2001). A result of 
this is also that banking itself has become more transaction-based and less reliant on direct 
customer interaction (Parlour and Plantin, 2008).  
From a bank’s perspective, credit risk management using CDS contracts can also have 
regulatory benefits. It may, for instance, facilitate the transfer of credit risk away from bank 
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holding companies that are subject to regulatory capital requirements, towards entities with 
lower economic costs associated with holding the risk. Hedging of credit risk through CDS 
contracts can also have administrative and judicial benefits compared to the more complex 
transaction associated with the sale and transfer of the underlying loan (BoE, 2001). For 
these reasons, commercial banks are among the largest players in the credit derivatives 
market (ECB, 2009).5 Additionally, commercial banks are among the largest lenders in the 
corporate credit market.  It is therefore natural to assume that some of these banks may 
have incentives that would make them empty creditors on some portion of their loan 
exposures. 
Another major group of CDS market participants are hedge funds and other risk 
seeking investment funds (BoE, 2001). They generally act as speculators that seek to make 
returns from pricing discrepancies between the CDS and related cash bond, or what is often 
referred to as a basis trade (O’Kane and McAdie, 2001). Otherwise, they may seek to profit 
from directional trades based on a view on the outlook of the credit quality of the reference 
entity. As hedge funds and investment funds are also large holders of corporate debt, they 
are prime candidates to become empty creditors.  
CDS markets have also been important for the growth of structured finance, which 
may contribute to empty creditor problems. Among others, CDSs have been a quintessential 
tool in the structuring of synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDO) (ECB, 2009), a form 
of CDO where exposure is gained through the use of a CDS referenced to the underlying 
entities instead of outright ownership. CDOs can impede renegotiation of the contractual 
relationship between borrowers and lenders due to their complicated ownership structures. 
For instance, CDO trustees may have limited incentives to be actively involved in workouts 
and different tranche holders can have opposing economic interests in the fate of the CDO 
they own (Hu and Black, 2008b).   
Even if certain characteristics of the CDS market seem favorable to the empty 
creditor hypothesis, it is difficult to obtain hard evidence of empty creditors on the basis of 
actual credit events. The lack of evidence is in large part due to the fact that CDS positions of 
                                                     
5
 The demand for CDS contracts has also led to the growth of an industry of credit protection sellers that consists of 
traditional insurance companies, as well as specialized sellers of credit protection, also referred to as monolines. Failed 
insurance giant AIG was a particularly important player in this market (ECB, 2009). 
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specific creditors are not disclosed – even after a firm files for bankruptcy – which means 
that real-life examples of empty creditors are mostly anecdotal. Hu and Black (2008b), for 
example, refer to a case where a junior creditor in a bankruptcy court was complaining that 
the firm’s value was too high, even though that assessment would hurt the class of debt the 
creditor held.  One case involving Goldman Sachs in the aftermath of the bailout of AIG in 
2008 has also often been cited, although it does not qualify as a credit event. More 
specifically, Goldman upheld its right to demand full collateral from AIG, regardless of the 
adverse impact that the demand had on the liquidity of the distressed insurer. Apparently, 
Goldman, having hedged its exposure to AIG with credit default swaps, was an empty 
creditor of AIG (Hu, 2009). Other anecdotal evidence includes Mirant Corporation, an energy 
company that in 2003 sought bankruptcy protection after failing to negotiate with its lenders 
who had bought credit protection. Rumors of empty creditors have also surfaced in recent 
bankruptcies involving US auto companies Chrysler and General Motors, amusement park 
operator Six Flags, property investor General Growth Properties and Canadian paper 
manufacturer AbitibiBowater (see Appendix B for an overview). 
d) Testing the empty creditor hypothesis 
Given that it is hard to observe empty creditors directly, we can only test for their 
presence using indirect approaches. In doing so, it is useful to break down the arguments 
that Hu and Black (2008b) make into operational hypothesis that can be analyzed 
individually. Firstly, the empty creditor hypothesis assumes that a hedged creditor within 
bankruptcy will try to increase the value of their CDS positions by manipulating the value of 
the settlement. This argument, however, seems unlikely based on how the rules regulating 
the settlement procedures work.  
The settlement procedures set forth by the ISDA opens for either physical or cash 
settlement of a CDS contract. Under physical settlement, which was the market convention 
until 2005, the protection buyer delivers the defaulted bonds to the protection seller in 
return for payment of the bond’s par value. Once the bonds are delivered, the CDS buyer will 
have no incentive to affect the price of the defaulted obligations. Under cash settlement, the 
protection seller pays the loss amount to the buyer, where the loss amount is the difference 
between the bond’s par value and post-default value determined in a settlement auction. 
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The settlement auction usually takes place within 30 days of the Credit Event Determination 
Date, and eliminates the need for physical delivery of the bonds. The auction also includes 
safeguards to deter aggressive bidding, such as penalizing crossed bids and offers as well as 
requiring bid and offer prices to be within a fixed spread of each other (Mengle, 2009). 
These safeguards, and the limited time from a credit event takes place until settlement, 
effectively decouples compensation from the bankruptcy proceedings and prevents 
participants from manipulating the auction.  
The second prediction of the empty creditor hypothesis is that creditors can benefit 
from building up negative economic exposure to a distressed debtor. This argument also 
seems unlikely because the strategy would be prohibitively expensive. As long as the CDS 
market is efficient, CDS spreads will incorporate the expected loss of insolvency and 
therefore rise in line with a firm’s probability of distress. For an over-hedging strategy to 
succeed a CDS buyer would have to successfully anticipate a credit event at a considerable 
length of time before it actually occurs, when spreads are still low. Unless a trader has 
superior knowledge or some form of inside information to base the trades on, the possibility 
to profitably implement such a strategy is likely to be slim.  
A third, and more feasible prediction of the empty creditor hypothesis, is related to 
the exercise of contractual rights prior to bankruptcy. For a creditor that owns CDS on a 
debtor that becomes distressed, the value of the CDS positions will increase in relation to 
the deterioration of the credit quality of the debtor. The creditor can choose to unwind his 
position at any time at the given market price, or he can hold on to the CDS contracts until 
their outcome is decided. For creditors that do not unwind their CDS positions, the choice is 
usually between restructuring outside bankruptcy and restructuring in bankruptcy. The 
empty creditor hypothesis predicts that hedged creditors are less likely to approve an out-of-
court restructuring than hedged creditors.  
The reason is related to how debt restructurings are treated as a credit event.  Under 
the ISDA definitions, a credit event is defined as the occurrence of one or more of the 
following six events: bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation acceleration, obligation default, 
and repudiation/moratorium (ISDA, 2003). An empty creditor would therefore prefer for a 
firm to restructure in bankruptcy, rather than restructure privately, because the bankruptcy 
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filing would constitute a credit event and trigger payment on the creditor’s CDS positions. 
The value of the CDS positions will also be higher in a bankruptcy restructuring if one 
assumes that bankruptcy is more costly for the firm than a private workout.  
It should be noted that prior to 2009, restructurings were also considered to be a 
credit event under the North American market convention, and it still is in Asian markets. 
However, in order for a restructuring to qualify as a credit event it was required to be 
binding for all creditors holding the obligation. In practice this means that out-of-court 
restructurings have never triggered a credit event, since private workouts are rarely 
accepted by the full majority of creditors (Mengle, 2009). The reason is that it is difficult to 
obtain consent from all creditors in an exchange offer because non-pivotal bondholders 
have incentives to free-ride (Grossman and Hart, 1980).  
Even if firms with hedged creditors are less likely to restructure out of court, the 
choice between a private restructuring and bankruptcy is complicated by a broad range of 
factors that influence the relative cost of the two solutions. The relevant issue is whether 
hedging with credit default swaps systematically leads to a choice of bankruptcy over a 
private workout, after these other factors are accounted for. It is this question that we test 
empirically by analyzing a sample of distressed U.S. firms that have either successfully 
completed an out-of-court restructuring or filed for bankruptcy.   
2.3 The economics of bankruptcy 
Our approach requires an understanding of the bankruptcy process, including its 
costs and benefits. In this section we will therefore discuss the mechanisms of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code as well as a firm’s incentives for choosing between private renegotiation 
and bankruptcy as alternative mechanism for dealing with financial distress. This discussion 
will contribute to the derivation of our proxy variables that serve as inputs in our analysis.  
A firm is in financial distress when the liquid assets of the firm are not sufficient to 
meet the current requirements of its hard contracts (Hotchkiss et al., 2008). Hard contracts, 
in this case, refer to contracts that guarantee periodic payments such as debt obligations 
owed to bondholders. One way to resolve financial distress is through a restructuring of the 
firm’s financial contracts. This restructuring can be achieved by negotiating with lenders to 
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reduce current obligations or defer them to a later date. Otherwise, the debt contracts can 
be exchanged with softer securities that have residual rather than fixed payoffs. In general, a 
debt restructuring provides relief from financial distress by replacing existing debt with new 
contracts that reduces interest or principal payments, extends the contracts’ maturity, or 
exchanges the debt for equity securities. 
The exchange of impaired claims for new securities can either be completed in a 
bankruptcy court or through a private renegotiation with creditors. The relative cost of each 
alternative and the benefits to different stakeholders will be influenced by the rules 
governing the bankruptcy process and the interests of the parties involved. 
a) Rules and procedures of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
Bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. are governed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978 and, more recently, by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005. Most bankruptcies fall 
under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Chapter 7 dictates the sale 
and liquidation of a corporation’s assets overseen by a trustee who is appointed by the 
courts. Proceeds from the asset sales are distributed to claimholders in order of the seniority 
of their claims. In Chapter 11, on the contrary, the goal of the bankruptcy proceedings is for 
the firm to emerge as a going concern. The claims against the firm and its operations 
undergo a formal reorganization that must be court-approved. Although creditors can 
initiate an involuntary Chapter 7 filing against a firm, the incumbent management retains 
the exclusive right to challenge any such petitions. As a result, most bankruptcies at least 
start out as management-initiated Chapter 11 reorganizations (Hotchkiss et al., 2008).  
Reorganization under Chapter 11 is designed to limit the abruptions to a firm’s daily 
operations. In general, continuity is ensured by allowing incumbent management to 
maintain control of the business. An automatic stay provision protects the firm against 
outside claims by halting all payments of interest and principal. The firm is also allowed to 
seek debtor-in-possession financing (DIP) that covers outlays for routine business expenses 
while the firm restructures. DIP financing is granted super-seniority which essentially strips 
seniority covenants from existing debt. This reduces the default risk of the new loan and 
encourages lending (Hotchkiss et al., 2008).  
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The reorganization plan states how the outstanding claims against the firm will be 
satisfied. Debt is usually grouped into classes according to priority and other characteristics 
and the plan formally specifies what each class will receive out of their pre-bankruptcy 
claims. The creditors’ compensation will usually be in the form of new debt securities, cash, 
equity, or a mix of all three. In addition to organizing the debtor’s outstanding liabilities, a 
reorganization plan may also impose substantial changes on a firm’s operations. Asset sales 
are commonly used to free up liquidity and spin off unprofitable operating units.   
Before a restructuring plan is approved, the bankrupt firm must demonstrate that it 
will not be forced to re-file for bankruptcy because of poor operating performance or an 
unsustainable capital structure. Despite these restrictions, the debtor retains the exclusive 
rights to propose a reorganization plan within 120 days of filing the bankruptcy petition. 
Before the rules were tightened in the Reform Act of 2005, this exclusivity period could also 
be extended at the discretion of the bankruptcy judge. Once a firm submits a plan within the 
exclusivity period, its creditors only have the choice to accept or reject the plan. Acceptance 
of the plan requires a two-thirds majority in terms of the value of the claims in each 
impaired class (or one-half in number, whichever is largest).  
In some cases, the firm and its creditors are able to agree on most terms of a 
restructuring deal before bankruptcy proceedings begin. Pre-packaged bankruptcies are a 
hybrid between a Chapter 11 filing and an out-of-court restructuring in which a pre-
negotiated reorganization plan is filed together with the bankruptcy petition itself. The 
benefits of pre-packaged filings are that a vote on the reorganization plan can be taken 
almost immediately, saving time and costs in bankruptcy (Gilson et al., 1990). 
In order to protect and organize the interests of the claimholders, Chapter 11 allows 
the appointment of committees to represent each claimholder class before the court. 
Committees normally consist of the seven largest members of a class of debt that are willing 
to serve. They have the power to hire legal counsel and other professional services whose 
costs are paid for from the assets of the debtor firm. Unsecured lenders are normally always 
represented by a committee and additional committees to represent other stakeholder 
classes, such as stockholders, can be appointed at the discretion of the bankruptcy judge.  
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If the different claimholder classes cannot agree on a reorganization plan, the 
bankruptcy court has the power to impose a cram down on dissenting classes as long as the 
plan is fair and equitable – that is, as long as the market value of the new securities that are 
distributed at least equals what each claimholder would receive in a liquidation sale. In 
practice, cram downs are very rare because they lead to a special hearing in which the court 
determines the going-concern value of the firm (Klee, 1979). These hearings are considered 
extremely time consuming and expensive. Avoidance of cram downs also explains deviations 
from the absolute priority rule under which senior creditors are compensated in full before 
junior claims are granted. The reason is that classes that receive nothing in a reorganization 
plan are automatically deemed to oppose it which gives senior creditors an incentive to 
relinquish parts of their claims in order to reach an agreement. Empirical studies also show 
that deviations from the absolute priority rule are common in practice (Franks and Torous, 
1989; Eberhart et al., 1990; and Weiss, 1990). 
b) The choice between bankruptcy and private renegotiation 
 The choice between restructuring privately or within bankruptcy will depend on the 
relative costs of the two choices. Under the lower-cost alternative, the firm’s value will 
remain higher after the restructuring, which will give claimholders the chance to receive 
more favorable terms. We usually distinguish between direct and indirect costs related to 
financial distress. Direct costs include out-of-pocket costs such as fees for legal services and 
financial advice. Indirect costs include all other hidden costs of undergoing financial distress, 
examples of which are the cost of foregoing positive NPV investment opportunities and the 
distraction of managers’ time and efforts. Both direct and indirect costs are generally 
assumed to be higher for bankruptcies than for out-of-court restructurings because the 
bankruptcy process is more time consuming and complex. The bankruptcy proceedings are 
slowed down by formal rules for filing motions and disputing claims. Furthermore, 
bankruptcy lawyers have an incentive to prolong the proceedings because their fees are paid 
from the debtor’s assets as a priority claim.  
Direct measurement of the costs of bankruptcy and private restructurings is difficult, 
but some evidence has been generated. Gilson et al. (1990) measure the cost of 
restructuring public debt through exchange offers and find it to be as low as 0.6%, on 
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average, of the book value of assets. In the same study, the time spent restructuring out of 
court is found to be significantly lower than the time spent in bankruptcy, which indicates 
that indirect costs are lower as well. Evidence is also found in the stock market’s reaction to 
a workout versus a bankruptcy filing. Chatterjee et al. (1995) report less negative abnormal 
returns for announcements of restructurings than bankruptcy filings. Furthermore, Franks 
and Torous (1994) find that senior lenders are more willing to relinquish their claims in favor 
of junior claimants in a private workout than in bankruptcy. In other words, senior creditors 
prefer a smaller fraction of a potentially more valuable firm in a workout, indicating that 
workouts are less costly than bankruptcy.  
The cost disadvantage of bankruptcy is offset by factors that impede an out-of-court 
agreement among all claimholders. A restructuring attempt may not succeed if some 
claimants hold out for more generous terms or if conflicts materialize between holders of 
different classes of debt. Such problems often result from the fact that individual lenders 
have incentives to free-ride on the expectation that other creditors will make the necessary 
concessions to complete the restructuring (Grossman and Hart, 1980). Typically, 
coordination problems between creditors are more severe in private workouts because an 
out-of-court restructuring requires the unanimous consent of all creditors. In a formal 
bankruptcy process, however, most decisions require only a specified majority of the holders 
of each class of debt. Alternatively, creditors can be forced to accept the terms by court 
intervention. The automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy regulations also avoids a run on 
the company by its lenders to collect reimbursement or seize collateral, and ensures an 
orderly queuing of claims.  
Hold-out problems are likely to increase in line with the number of creditors that 
participate in the restructuring since it will be harder to coordinate the interests of all 
parties. Smith and Warner (1979) argue that private debt is easier to restructure because it 
is owed to fewer lenders. On the other hand, fewer lenders could lead to bargaining 
deadlocks if individual creditors feel more powerful in the negotiations. It is also generally 
thought that conflicts among creditors increase with the complexity of a firm’s capital 
structure. Differences in terms of seniority, security and other characteristics call for 
different settlement terms that often undermine the interests of claims in different classes. 
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Agreeing on a restructuring plan that seems equitable to all parties will therefore be more 
difficult.  
Coordination problems between lenders of different classes may also increase if the 
firm is highly leveraged. The reason is that the value of junior claims increases with the 
riskiness of the firm’s assets, while the value of senior claims decreases with risk. While the 
latter group has their claims secured in the assets of the firm, junior claims exhibit equity-
like characteristics whose properties resemble a call option as the firm becomes distressed. 
Senior lenders with collateralized claims may therefore prefer a liquidation or asset sale to 
ensure a safe distribution, while junior creditors and out-of-the-money shareholders may 
prefer to uphold business as usual because it provides them with a potential upside 
(Hotchkiss et al., 2008). In a study related to this problem, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) 
present a model where the existence of multiple classes of creditors can lead to inefficient 
decisions on liquidation versus reorganization.   
Negotiation problems will also depend on the type of debt that is being restructured. 
The holdout problem is thought to be particularly severe for public bonds. The reason is that, 
under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, a change in the interest, principal or maturity of 
public debt outside of bankruptcy requires the unanimous consent of all bondholders. Even 
if an out-of-court restructuring could be completed by an exchange offer, the cost of the 
restructuring will be born entirely by those who choose to exchange their bonds. If individual 
bondholders realize their decision to hold out will not materially affect the outcome of the 
restructuring, they may have a rational incentive to oppose a restructuring, even if it is in the 
collective interest to avoid bankruptcy. 
Lower success of a private workout has also been associated with relatively more 
debt being owed to trade creditors and less debt being owed to bank lenders. The number 
of trade creditors is often quite large and their claims are relatively heterogeneous, which 
exacerbates renegotiation problems. The same argument applies to a firm with significant 
contingent liabilities, such as a product liability or pension obligations, where the claimants 
can number in the thousands. Banks and other private lenders, on the other hand are usually 
fewer in number and are considered to be more forgiving in debt renegotiations. These 
lenders usually have stronger incentives to provide financing in the short-term in order to 
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lock-in customers in the long-term, since it will be easier for them to internalize the benefits 
associated with assisting the distressed firm (Petersen and Rajan, 1995).  Gilson et al. (1990) 
finds evidence that bank lenders are more willing to settle outside Chapter 11 and also 
argues that they perform a better role of monitoring their debtors.  
Conflicts among creditors aside, consent for a private restructuring plan will be 
harder to obtain if there is greater information asymmetry between stockholders and 
creditors concerning the value of a firm. Managers control inside information and they have 
incentives, aligned with those of stockholders, to improve outside perceptions of the firm in 
order to maximize the value of their claims in a restructuring. DeAngelo et al. (1994) show 
that distressed firms use accounting accruals to influence restructuring negotiations, while 
Heinkel and Zecher (1993) demonstrate that distressed firms have the incentive to disguise a 
firm’s true value and avoid liquidation. Creditors are likely to anticipate this, and the 
resulting lemons problem will serve to impede private workout efforts. In Chapter 11, the 
problem of asymmetric information is likely to be much less pronounced. Firms are required 
to make extensive disclosures of their financial and operating data and additional 
information is revealed through court testimony by experts and company insiders. 
3. Hypotheses and variables 
We are now in a position to develop a set of hypotheses about what determines a 
firm’s choice between bankruptcy and a private restructuring and tie them to observable 
firm characteristics. Table 3 provides an overview of our hypotheses and test variables.  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Firms with outstanding credit insurance on their debt will have a 
lower probability of completing a successful out-of-court restructuring. 
Our main concern is to test the effect of a firm’s exposure to credit insurance on the 
choice between private restructuring and bankruptcy. In line with the empty creditor 
hypothesis, we make the assumption that a firm on which credit default swaps are traded 
will be less inclined to restructure privately. Hedged creditors have stronger bargaining 
positions and may have more to gain by bankruptcy than their unhedged counterparts. Since 
CDS contracts are not publically traded, market data on CDS transactions and who holds 
what positions are not readily available. We therefore rely on a dummy variable that equals 
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one if there are CDS traded on a company’s debt in the year of the restructuring/bankruptcy 
and zero otherwise. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Firms with higher going-concern values tied up in intangible assets 
and assets that generate firm-specific rents will be more likely to renegotiate debt 
out-of-court. 
The previous section argued that bankruptcies are, in general, considered to be more 
costly than a private restructuring. The expected cost saving from settling out of court, 
however, is likely to vary among firms. Since direct costs in a restructuring are not readably 
observable, we choose instead to distinguish between firms based on their expected loss of 
going-concern value. The empirical proxy that we use is a measure of enterprise market to 
book value.  
The market to book value is likely to be higher for a firm that has more intangible 
assets or a combination of assets that generate firm-specific rents, such as growth-
opportunities, human capital and operating synergies that depend on the composition of the 
assets. Such a firm is also likely to find bankruptcy more expensive due to the indirect costs 
associated with bankruptcy, such as managerial distraction, loss of consumer and supplier 
confidence, and because bankruptcy often leads to asset sales. Asset sales are more 
common within bankruptcy because covenant violations that would otherwise have 
prevented them can be waived by a judge if the court views the sale necessary to preserve 
the firm’s chances of survival. Fully secured lenders may also add pressure to sell assets that 
would reimburse their claims. In addition, buying assets from a distressed firm is safer in 
Chapter 11, because the sale is executed and guaranteed by a court order.  
One potential problem with using the market to book value for a firm is that it may 
reflect some or all of the market’s expectations about how well the firm will be able to deal 
with financial distress. In this case the variable will inadequately capture a firm’s ex ante 
going-concern value. In order to take this fact into consideration we take the average of the 
market and book values for equity and debt over the two years prior to the first mention of a 
firm’s restructuring effort. By doing so, we obtain a more unbiased measure of a firm’s 
going-concern value as judged by its market to book value.  
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Hypothesis 3 (H3): Creditor conflicts and deficient lender coordination reduce the 
likelihood of a successful private restructuring. 
In order to capture the severity of the holdout problem and creditor conflicts we 
apply several different proxies. Firstly, we assume that troubled debt is more likely to be 
restructured outside Chapter 11 when it is owed to fewer lenders. Secondly, higher 
leveraged firms are assumed to be more prone to bankruptcy than lower leveraged firms. 
Intuitively, one could argue that higher leverage exacerbates the level of financial distress 
and will land a firm more quickly in bankruptcy. Jensen (1989), however, argues that since 
firms with high leverage have going-concern values far above their liquidation values they 
will have more to lose in bankruptcy and will therefore restructure out-of-court. This may be 
true of some firms that face financial distress due to excessive debt levels, but the nature of 
our sampling method means that the majority of the firms are not only financially distressed, 
but economically distressed – i.e. they have negative operating cash flows. For such firms, 
going-concern values may be much closer to liquidation values. And as we noted in the 
section above, higher leverage can increase the coordination problems between lenders of 
different classes, which may only be resolved in bankruptcy. We measure leverage as total 
assets over total liabilities and make the hypothesis that higher leverage reduces the chance 
of an out-of-court restructuring.  
 Third, we employ as a proxy the portion of public debt that the firm owes, 
normalized by total liabilities. As we argued previously, restructuring public debt is difficult 
because it requires the unanimous consent of all bondholders to change the indentures of 
the bonds and individual bondholders have a rational incentive not to participate in the 
negotiations. A high portion of public debt is therefore believed to reduce the probability of 
a successful out-of-court restructuring. By the same token, a high portion of trade debt is 
likely to impede a private workout. Firms that are more reliant on trade debt may also view 
Chapter 11 favorably because super-priority provisions make it easier to raise working 
capital through DIP financing. As a proxy for the importance of trade credit we use the 
amount of trade payables over total liabilities. Finally, we also test the amount of bank debt, 
divided by total liabilities. A high portion of bank debt is assumed to increase the chances of 
an out-of-court restructuring because bank lenders are generally fewer in number and more 
willing to negotiate terms.  
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Table 3: Hypotheses and variables 
 
 
Hypothesis Explanation Proxy variables Definition Source Expected impact on restructuring 
outcome for increase in variable
H1: Credit insurance Creditors who have bought credit insurance 
will be in a tougher bargaining position and 
may prefer a restructuring in bankruptcy in 
order to receive a payoff on their insurance 
positions
Availability of CDS on 
a firm's debt
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's 
debt has traded CDS contracts and 0 
otherwise
Datastream, 
Worldscope, Factiva
Lower probability of successful 
private restructuring
H2: Firm value Firms with more intangible and firm 
specific assets are expected to experience 
a higher destruction of value in bankruptcy 
and therefore have more to gain from a 
private workout
Enterprise market to 
book ratio
Market value of common equity plus 
book value of debt and preferred / 
Book value of common equity plus 
book value of debt and preferred (2-
year average)
CRSP, Compustat, 
Company filings
Higher probability of successful 
private restructuring
Leverage Total assets over total liabilities Compustat, Company 
filings
Lower probability of successful 
private restructuring
Number of  financing 
contracts
Number of debt securities listed in 10-
K filing
Company filings, 
Datastream
Lower probability of successful 
private restructuring
Fraction of public debt Total public debt over total liabilities Compustat, Company 
filings
Lower probability of successful 
private restructuring
Fraction of bank debt Total bank debt over total liabilities Compustat, Company 
filings
Higher probability of successful 
private restructuring
Fraction of trade debt Trade payables over total liabilities Compustat, Company 
filings
Lower probability of successful 
private restructuring
Stock-return volatility Standard deviation of returns 
measured three to five years prior to 
restructuring
CRSP, Datastream, 
Worldscope
Lower probability of successful 
private restructuring
Fraction of bank debt Total bank debt over total liabilities Compustat, Company 
filings
Higher probability of successful 
private restructuring
H3: Creditor conflicts
H4: Information asymmetry Creditors with information disadvantages 
may prefer to opt for a court supervised 
restructuring in order to ensure a fair 
disclosure of information
Firms with more complex, heterogenous 
debt structures are expected to find an out-
of-court restructuring more difficult. The 
type of debt being restructured is thought 
to influence the expected outcome with 
public and trade credit likely to increase 
the severity of holdout problems among 
creditors. Higher leverage increases 
coordination problems between senior and 
junior lenders 
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Hypothesis 4 (H4): Higher informational asymmetry between debtors and creditors 
reduces the chance of a private workout. 
We attempt to measure the degree of information asymmetry by looking at the stock 
return volatility of the firms in our sample. Stock return volatility may reflect the market’s 
perception of changes in value. Companies whose values are harder to judge by outsiders 
are likely to experience more volatility in their returns than more transparent companies as 
prices “jump” according to the release of new information. Given that stock returns are a 
noisy measure that reflects all available information and will be influenced by a firm’s future 
prospects, we isolate the returns between three and five years prior to the debt 
restructuring attempt. Finally, the portion of bank debt financing may also be used as a 
proxy for asymmetric information. The reason is that banks generally perform a good 
monitoring role of their debtors and because bank debt usually contains extensive covenants 
that reveal information about a firm’s operating strengths and weaknesses. A higher portion 
of bank debt should therefore decrease information asymmetry problems and increase the 
chance of a private workout.  
4. Data and sample selection 
Our approach to testing the impact of CDS on the choice between bankruptcy and a 
private restructuring requires us to identify two subsamples of firms that have completed 
either action in the face of financial distress. While identifying bankrupt firms if fairly 
straightforward, there are no clear definitions for what constitutes an out-of-court 
restructuring. A debt restructuring does not require an official announcement and SEC filings 
about a restructuring often lack detail. Debt may also be restructured in several rounds over 
a prolonged period of time. In order to deal with these complications we employ a two-step 
sampling procedure which first identifies financially distressed firms by their poor stock price 
performance and then establishes whether a private restructuring attempt or bankruptcy 
has occurred.  
This sampling method is a modified version of that used by Gilson et al. (1990) which 
calculates three-year cumulative common stock returns and isolates firms from the bottom 
fifth percentile on a yearly basis. Sampling firms based on their stock price returns has a 
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clear theoretical foundation. It is reasonable to assume that distressed firms consist of assets 
with low, or even negative, NPV, and that they operate with poor cash flow performance. 
Such characteristics should be easily identified by capital markets and will manifest 
themselves as lower prices on the financial claims issued by the firm. In fact, if we assume 
that capital markets have rational expectations, we should expect that a firm’s financial 
troubles will be discounted in the share price long before they actually arise (Muth, 1961).  
Firms with very poor stock price performance should therefore be expected to either 
be in financial distress or at least be in the process of becoming distressed. Compared to a 
simple search for firms that have gone through a financial restructuring, the method offers a 
clear advantage by eliminating non-distressed firms that have voluntarily restructured their 
debt for other reasons than avoiding default. Additionally, the method provides a more 
representative sample compared to a search for firms that have defaulted on their 
obligations, because it also picks up restructurings that have been successfully completed 
without any defaults (Gilson et al., 1990). 
The first stage of our sampling procedure was to identify all traded companies on the 
NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX stock exchanges in the period 1995 to 2010. From the initial 
sample of 12,703 firms, we removed firms with securities whose quoted price was constant 
throughout the entire period (primarily various trust securities), which left us with a total of 
8,898 firms. Next we calculated three-year cumulative common stock returns for each 
separate firm on a monthly basis, and the corresponding lower fifth percentile. From this we 
computed a stratum of 1,627 firms, which consists of companies that traded with a three-
year cumulative common stock return below the calculated fifth percentile in at least 6 
months consecutively at any time during the 15-year sampling period.  
Note that we have constructed our sample using a somewhat finer definition, both in 
terms of returns and sampling interval, compared to Gilson et al. (1990), which operated 
with an initial stratum of 447 firms. Our method should therefore increase the probability of 
picking up distressed companies compared to previous studies. It is also worth noting that 
the choice of sampling criteria represents a trade-off between the strata size and the ability 
to pick up relevant firms. 
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The use of a higher cut-off percentile, a shorter time limit for calculating cumulative 
returns, and using non-consecutive rather consecutive sampling (i.e. not requiring firms to 
be within the lower fifth percentile for back-to-back periods) would lead to a larger stratum 
– and vice versa. Although a larger stratum would probably enable us to pick up more 
distressed firms, it would also come at the cost of a considerably higher work load in the 
subsequent steps of the analysis. Our sampling criteria were therefore chosen by seeking to 
optimize the trade-off between these two considerations. However, for the sake of 
completeness, we have also included a sensitivity analysis in Table 4 that shows how other 
sampling criteria choices would affect the stratum size. 
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis of the number of sampled firms on sampling criteria 
 
The table shows a sensitivity analysis of the number of firms that remained in our sample after the first stage 
of the sampling procedure, subject to changes in the sampling criteria. Percentile, on the left, refers to the cut-
off percentile calculated for each firm based on three-year cumulative stock returns. All firms with cumulative 
stock returns below this percentile were kept in the sample. Number of months refers to how many months in 
the 15-year period the firms had cumulative stock returns below the cut-off percentile. Consecutive sampling 
means that the firms had stock returns below a given percentile, for a given number of months consecutively. 
Using non-consecutive sampling, the months in which the firms entered the sample could be spread arbitrarily 
throughout the entire 15-year period.   
 
In the next step of the sampling procedure, we performed manual searches on each 
separate company in the sampled stratum using Dow Jones & Company’s Factiva news 
Consecutive sampling
Percentile (%) 1 2 3 6 12 24
1.0% 850 644 546 374 179 44
2.5% 1,763 1,446 1,249 866 455 125
5.0% 2,807 2,406 2,147 1,627 916 299
7.5% 3,591 3,169 2,874 2,256 1,388 500
10.0% 4,221 3,755 3,452 2,810 1,862 711
Non-consecutive sampling
Percentile (%) 1 2 3 6 12 24
1.0% 850 688 601 431 233 72
2.5% 1,763 1,532 1,360 1,025 603 204
5.0% 2,807 2,520 2,297 1,877 1,234 513
7.5% 3,591 3,280 3,051 2,533 1,797 839
10.0% 4,221 3,892 3,634 3,120 2,343 1,210
Number of months
Number of months
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database.6 The search criteria were selected in order to best identify companies that have 
either successfully completed a private restructuring or have filed for bankruptcy.7 For each 
firm we noted whether it had gone through an out-of-court restructuring or bankruptcy, the 
dates of the first and last mention of the event and, if applicable, what type of restructuring 
the firm had carried out. Out-of-court restructurings were identified using the definition 
proposed by Gilson et al. (1990). A debt restructuring is defined as a transaction in which an 
existing debt contract is replaced by a new contract with one or more of the following 
consequences: (i) required interest or principal payments on the debt are reduced; (ii) the 
maturity of the debt is extended; or (iii) creditors are given equity securities (common stock 
or securities convertible into common stock), or what is often referred to as an exchange 
offer. In addition, we also demanded that the restructuring must have been undertaken in 
response to an anticipated or actual default. If no indications of a restructuring or 
bankruptcy were found, the company was discarded from the sample. Moreover, 
restructurings that were found to be the result of government sponsored bailouts or other 
federal guarantees were also discarded. 
Two complications did, however, arise in relation to our sampling method. Firstly, we 
quickly realized that many of the firms in our sample were drawn from what is often referred 
to as “the dotcom period”. In most cases these “dotcom” companies were fully equity 
financed, and were therefore not relevant from a debt restructuring perspective. 
Additionally, many of these companies were typically very small at the time they entered 
into our sample, which made it difficult to find any relevant news postings surrounding their 
fate. These two factors complicated the search process and made it more tedious. 
Nevertheless, a substantial portion of our sample is made up of IT and related companies 
due to their lackluster performance after the burst of the asset bubble in the early 2000s.  
Secondly, and perhaps more serious, we discovered that our sample had an 
underrepresentation of firms that filed for bankruptcy due to the way Datastream outputs 
bankrupt companies. To get a correct representation of bankruptcies we therefore 
supplemented our sample with bankrupt firms from Professor Lynn M. LoPucki’s bankruptcy 
                                                     
6
 More specifically we used the Factiva search engine on the following sources: Reuters, Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg 
Dow Jones, and Financial Times. In some cases we also relied on other information sources to supplement the information 
gathered on Factiva, most notably Google Finance.  
7
 We used the following search keywords:  debt restructuring, restructure, restructured, bankrupt, bankruptcy, distress, 
distressed, default, and defaults. 
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database. In order to ensure consistency between the out-of-court and in-court subsamples 
we demanded that companies sampled from the LoPucki database were reported to have 
engaged in debt restructuring efforts prior to filing for bankruptcy. The firms for which a 
private restructuring had been attempted were again identified by searching the Factiva 
database for company statements and news reports. In this way we ensured that the total 
sample consisted of companies that had all tried to restructure their debt, and whose efforts 
could be categorized into either successful or unsuccessful outcomes. 
After the two subsamples were constructed, we collected stock price data, balance 
sheet information and other relevant data from various sources. Common stock return data 
were obtained from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), while information on 
the composition of firms’ liabilities and outstanding number of financing contracts are taken 
from company filings found in the EDGAR (SEC) Database. Balance sheet and income 
statement data is collected from Standard & Poor’s Compustat Database. In addition, we 
used the Thomson Reuters Datastream database to obtain data on CDS contracts traded on 
the firms’ debt, as well as to verify the number of outstanding public debt contracts. 
5. Results 
5.1 Sample characteristics and univariate analysis 
Most of the debt-restructuring activity in our sample is clustered around two time 
periods that coincide with general U.S. recessions. The first time period, between 1999 and 
2003, marks the burst of the dotcom bubble and the economic downturn that followed 
(Kindleberger and Aliber 2005). The second wave of restructurings occurs between 2007 and 
2009, which coincides with the recent financial turmoil that spilled into a global economic 
recession.  
In total, about 55% of the total restructuring attempts in our sample occur between 
1999 and 2003, while 31% take place between 2007 and 2009. If we compare the frequency 
of out-of-court restructurings to bankruptcies, private workouts seem to be relatively more 
common during the most recent recession. Of all the restructuring attempts between 1999 
and 2003, 32% were completed out-of-court, while the same proportion between 2007 and 
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2009 is 47%. There is, however, no significant trend in the relative frequencies of successful 
and unsuccessful private restructurings if we look at the sample as a whole.8  
Table 5: Sample time series by restructuring outcome 
 
Time series of observed debt restructuring activity between 1995 and 2010 by starting date and eventual 
outcome. 86 firms in our sample successfully restructure privately, while 132 firms file for bankruptcy. A debt 
restructuring attempt is defined as the replacement of a debt contract that results in reduced interest or 
principal, extended maturity or a debt-for-equity swap. Evidence of debt restructuring events are identified by 
searching the Dow Jones and Company’s Factiva news database.   
 
Alternatively, we can break down the two subsamples by sector. The classification in 
Table 6 is based on the Global Industry Classification System (GICS). Successful out-of-court 
restructurings occur less often for companies classified under Materials, Telecommunication 
Services and Consumer Discretionary, measured as a percentage of the subsample size. 
Firms under Industrials, Health Care and Financials are relatively more prone to restructure 
privately in our sample. As a trend over time, Information Technology and 
Telecommunications firms feature more frequently in the early 2000’s, while Financials 
                                                     
8
 The absence of a significant time trend in the share of out-of-court and in-court debt restructurings is found by running a 
simple ordinary least square (OLS) regression given by                     . We find a p-value of 0.1750 for the    
coefficient (0.1060 if only the years 1999-2003 and 2007-2009 are included).  
Year Total
Successful 
restructurings
Unsuccessful restructurings 
(bankruptcies)
Percentage of successful 
restructurings
1995 1 1 0 100.0%
1996 1 1 0 100.0%
1997 2 1 1 50.0%
1998 8 3 5 37.5%
1999 17 8 9 47.1%
2000 18 3 15 16.7%
2001 24 8 16 33.3%
2002 33 7 26 21.2%
2003 27 12 15 44.4%
2004 6 4 2 66.7%
2005 9 2 7 22.2%
2006 4 2 2 50.0%
2007 11 5 6 45.5%
2008 29 13 16 44.8%
2009 28 16 12 57.1%
Total 218 86 132 39.4%
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make up a significant share in 2008 and 2009. Consumer Discretionary is the largest industry 
sector featured in our sample and makes up over 30% of the total.9  
Table 6: Restructuring outcome by industry sector  
 
Sample of firms that attempt a debt restructuring divided by sector and outcome. The sectors are based on the 
Global Industry Classification System (GICS) and the classification for each firm is found in the Compustat 
database. The table shows how firms in each subsample are divided among the different sectors, expressed as a 
number and as a percentage of the subsample and total sample.  
 
The CDS market was still in its infancy during the first wave of corporate financial 
distress between 1999 and 2003 and, as a result, only ten firms in our sample that are drawn 
from this time period have outstanding CDS contracts traded on their debt. As shown in 
                                                     
9
The industry consists of the sub-industries Automobiles and Components (2510), Consumer Durables and Apparel (2520), 
Consumer Services (2530), Media (2540), and Retailing (2550). 
Out-of-court        
(% of subsample)
4 (5%) 3 (3%) 13 (15%) 23 (27%) 4 (5%) 6 (7%) 13 (15%) 12 (14%) 5 (6%) 3 (3%)
In-court                    
(% of subsample)
4 (3%) 12 (9%) 15 (11%) 43 (33%) 8 (6%) 3 (2%) 11 (8%) 13 (10%) 19 (14%) 4 (3%)
Total                             
(% of sample)
8 (4%) 15 (7%) 28 (13%) 66 (30%) 12 (6%) 9 (4%) 24 (11%) 25 (11%) 24 (11%) 7 (3%)
Financials
Information 
Technology
Telecom UtilitiesEnergy Materials Industrials
Consumer 
Discretionary
Consumer 
Staples
Health Care
Table 7: Successful and unsuccessful restructurings with CDSs traded on debt 
 
Time series of firms that have outstanding CDS traded on their debt in the year of their restructuring attempt. 
The table classifies each firm by whether it completes a successful private restructuring or if the restructuring 
attempt is unsuccessful and the firm files for bankruptcy. The years that are shaded refer to periods that 
coincide with general recessions where debt restructuring activity is higher than normal. We show both the 
number of firms with CDS in each year, and the percentage of firms with CDS. Information on CDS is gathered 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream.     
Year # % # % # %
1999 0 - 0 - 0 -
2000 0 - Avg. 0 - Avg. 0 - Avg.
2001 0 - 13% 2 13% 6% 2 8% 8%
2002 2 29% 1 4% 3 9%
2003 3 25% 2 13% 5 19%
2004 0 - 0 - 0 -
2005 0 - 2 29% 2 22%
2006 0 - 2 100% 2 50%
2007 2 40% Avg. 2 33% Avg. 4 36% Avg.
2008 3 23% 38% 6 38% 47% 9 31% 43%
2009 8 50% 8 67% 16 57%
Sum / average 18 25% 25 21% 43 23%
Successful Unsuccessful Total
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Table 7, these ten firms are equally distributed between successful and unsuccessful private 
restructurings and make up 13% and 6% of the two subsamples in the period, respectively. 
Only 8% of the firms in the total sample have outstanding CDS in the period between 1999 
and 2003.  
By 2007, however, the CDS market had grown exponentially for several years. 
Between 2007 and 2009, twenty-nine companies, or almost half of the total sample in this 
period, have outstanding CDS on their debt. Out of the total of twenty-nine, thirteen belong 
to the sample that successfully restructured their debt privately, while sixteen companies 
belong in the sample that went bankrupt. In relative terms, 38% of the first group and 47% 
of the second group, traded with CDS between 2007 and 2009. Whether there is a significant 
correlation between the outcome of the restructuring attempt and outstanding CDS 
(Hypothesis H1) is, however, difficult to ascertain with a univariate analysis given the limited 
size of our sample. The multivariate regressions in the next section shed more light on the 
issue by measuring the marginal effect of CDS after other factors have been adjusted for.   
Graph 2: Sample time series by outcome 
 
Overview of debt restructuring activity in our sample divided into successful and unsuccessful outcomes. The 
graph also shows the percentage of each subsample that have outstanding CDS traded on their debt in the year 
of their restructuring attempt. 
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Table 8 contrasts selected characteristics of the firms in our sample by whether or 
not they successfully restructure their debt outside of Chapter 11. Wilcoxon rank sum tests 
for the means and medians of the two subsamples are included for each variable. We find 
that firms that complete an out-of-court restructuring have higher enterprise market to 
book values, than those that file for bankruptcy, but the difference is not significant. One 
explanation for this result is that the variance in the price-book variable is high within each 
subsample. In hypothesis H2 we argued that firms with higher market to book values are 
likely to find bankruptcy more expensive and we would generally expect these firms to have 
incentives to restructure privately.  
Several measures of the firms’ indebtedness and liabilities are also included. The 
variables that we have tested are bank, public and secured debt, as well as trade payables 
and net pension obligations, all as a share of total liabilities.10  Of these, only the portion of 
public debt is statistically significantly different between the two subsamples. The 
conclusions are consistent with hypothesis H3 which posits that public debt should feature 
more in failed restructurings attempts due to higher coordination problems between public 
bondholders. 
There is no significant difference, however, in the mean and median number of 
outstanding financing contracts between the subsamples.11 In order to adjust for size we 
also test the number of financing contracts divided by total liabilities and find this variable to 
be significantly higher for the companies that restructure out-of-court (p-value 0.0288). This 
would seem to contradict our predictions if we assume that the number of financing 
contracts is a measure of the complexity of a firm’s capital structure. More claimholders as 
measured by the number of debt contracts would be expected to complicate a private 
workout.  
 
                                                     
10
 All of these variables have been collected from the Debt/Long-Term Financing/Notes Payable/Etc. Note and Employee 
Benefit Note in the latest 10-K filed by the company prior to the first mention date, except Accounts Payable which was 
retrieved from Compustat. Net pension liabilities for companies with defined contribution benefit plans are set to zero.  
11
 Number of financing contracts is the number of financing agreements (public debt, bonds, credit facilities, and other 
agreements) counted in the Debt/Long-Term Financing/Notes Payable/Etc. Note from the latest 10-K filed by the company 
prior to first mention date. The variable is scaled by a factor of 100. 
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Table 8: Sample characteristics 
 
 
Sources: The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), EDGAR (SEC) Database,  Lynn M. LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, Standard & Poor’s Compustat Database, Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
Characteristic Mean Median Min. Max. Mean Median Min. Max.
Market value/book value (EV, 2 year avg.) 1.58 1.25 0.60 8.45 1.02 1.19 -30.31 6.44 0.1443 0.3480
Debt/total liabilities (book values)
  (i) Bank debt 0.32 0.22 0.00 1.08 0.26 0.23 0.00 0.89 0.3476 0.7820
  (ii) Public debt 0.27 0.19 0.00 0.81 0.37 0.33 0.00 2.27 0.0077 *** 0.0130 **
  (iii) Secured debt 0.33 0.22 0.00 1.08 0.29 0.27 0.00 0.97 0.9387 0.2680
  (iv) Convertible debt 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.5886 0.6290  (v) Accounts payables (trade credit) 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.94 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.85 0.4303 0.5790
  (vi) Net pension liabilities 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.31 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.33 0.5689 0.5860
Number of financing contracts outstanding 7.1 4.5 1.0 41 7.3 5.0 1.0 73 0.1367 0.0610 *
Number of financing contracts/total liabilities 1.2 0.6 0.0 10.5 0.6 0.3 0.0 7.1 0.0288 ** 0.0270 **
Number of public debt contracts outstanding 2.8 0.0 0.0 37 3.4 1.0 0.0 68 0.1239 0.0300 **
Number of public debt contracts/total liabilities 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.1217 0.0300 **
Book value of total assets (USDm) 4,761 960 57 73,781 6,471 1,223 209 103,914 0.1204 0.4060
Total liabilites/book value of assets 0.80 0.77 0.21 2.93 0.99 0.86 0.34 7.76 0.0011 *** 0.0060 ***
Long-term debt/book value of assets 0.50 0.45 0.00 2.13 0.63 0.55 0.03 4.53 0.0049 *** 0.0052 ***
Prior 3-year accumulated common stock return 
  (i) Unadjusted returns (%) -45.9% -67.5% -98.1% 729.9% -55.1% -74.6% -100.0% 210.4% 0.7255 0.3360
  (ii) Abnormal returns (%) -56.9% -90.1% -100.0% 478.6% -85.4% -97.6% -100.0% 66.2% 0.0001 *** 0.0001 ***
Estimated beta (3 to 5 years prior) 0.98 0.86 -0.19 2.94 1.02 0.82 -0.01 5.41 0.9078 0.7730
Yearly stock return volatility (3 to 5 years prior) 45.4% 44.8% 4.2% 112.0% 51.0% 46.9% 15.1% 158.5% 0.1719 0.3690
Age (years since IPO/major merger) 15.1 10.7 1.0 83.3 15.3 7.6 0.6 100.9 0.0330 ** 0.0310 **
Length of debt restructuring (days) 139 65 30 1066 161 107 30 648 0.0032 *** 0.0520 *
(* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
86 succsessful restructurings 132 unsuccsessful restructurings
Wilcoxon rank-sum test           
(p-value of z test)
Mean Median
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Nonetheless, we may be able to reasonably explain the results if we break the 
number of total financing contracts into public12 and private13 contracts. While the 
difference in the number of public debt contracts divided by total liabilities is insignificant 
between the two subsamples, it is the number of private contracts that makes the total 
number of financing contracts (normalized by total liabilities) a significant variable. This 
result is consistent with our predictions and with bankruptcy theory. Firstly, we would 
expect the number of creditors per unique financing contract to be higher for public debt 
than private debt, and the holdout problem can therefore be expected to be less severe for 
private debt.  Secondly, as discussed previously, private lenders such as banks and other 
financial sponsors tend to be more forgiving in renegotiations. A higher number of private 
debt contracts, compared to public debt contracts, may therefore be consistent with a 
higher probability of completing a successful out-of-court restructuring (hypothesis H3). 
The mean asset size of firms that successfully restructure out of court is considerably 
lower than for firms that file for bankruptcy in our sample, but the difference is statistically 
insignificant due to the variability in size within each subsample. We can conclude, however, 
that firms in the out-of-court sample are much lower leveraged than their in-court 
counterparts. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are significant both when leverage is measured as 
the book values of total liabilities over total assets and when it is measured as the book 
values of long-term debt over total assets.14 This result is in line with hypothesis H3 and our 
discussion in Sections 2 and 3, which emphasizes the potential conflicts between junior and 
senior creditors in a highly leveraged firm. While senior creditors with collateralized claims 
may have more to gain from liquidation, junior creditors have an option-like residual claim 
whose value depends on the survival of the firm, when the firm value is deeply out-of-the-
money.  
There are no significant differences in the mean and median unadjusted cumulative 
common stock returns between the two subsamples when the returns are measured over a 
three-year period, counting back from the first mention of a firm’s restructuring attempt.  
                                                     
12
 Number of public debt contracts is the number of active publically traded debt securities found in Datastream prior to 
first mention date. This variable is also scaled by a factor of 100. 
13
 The number of private debt contracts is the difference between the total number of financing contracts and the number 
of public contracts 
14
 Total liabilities, total assets, and long-term debt are retrieved from Compustat using the last balance sheet date prior to 
first mention date. 
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Graph 3: Three-year unadjusted and abnormal cumulative sample returns 
 
The graph shows cumulative unadjusted returns for two portfolios made up of firms that restructure out-of-
court and firms that end up in bankruptcy, respectively. Firms enter the portfolio 756 trading days prior to the 
date that signifies the first mention of its restructuring effort. Returns are calculated from the daily prices 
reported by CRSP.  
 
 
The graph shows cumulative abnormal returns for two portfolios of firms in the out-of-court and in-court 
subsamples. Abnormal returns are calculated using a single-factor model based on CAPM (see footnote 16) and 
the daily CRSP equally-weighted return index. 
 
Source: The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
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Nonetheless, we recognize that if the out-of-court restructurings and bankruptcies in our 
sample are not distributed evenly over time, then the market return will be an important 
determinant of the stock returns of the firms in each subsample. In order to take market 
returns and systematic risk into account, we have estimated three-year cumulative abnormal 
returns for each subsample using a single-factor model.15 Abnormal cumulative returns are 
significantly higher for the firms that restructure privately, a result that is also robust to 
changes in the estimation period for the returns (see Appendix C).  
Table 9: Estimated risk measures 
 
Table of estimated betas and total stock return volatility for the two subsamples of out-of-court and in-court 
restructurings. Both beta and volatility have been estimated over two different time periods, measured in years 
prior to the first mention of a firm’s restructuring attempt. All figures are calculated based on daily price 
observations from CRSP. 
 
Source: The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
An analysis of stock returns furthermore allows us to make inferences on how the 
two subsamples differ in terms of systematic and unsystematic risk. Table 9 presents 
summary statistics of the most relevant observations. To begin with, there are no significant 
differences in the estimated mean and median betas – a result that is also robust to changes 
in the estimation period. We do, however, find the mean stock return volatility to be lower 
for the out-of-court subsample, particularly if we measure the volatility between 1 and 5 
years prior to the first mention of a firm’s restructuring attempt. OLS regressions of the 
volatility of the two subsamples with respect to the estimated betas, year, firm size and a 
dummy variable for the restructuring outcome, also supports these conclusions. The results 
                                                     
15
 Abnormal returns are estimated using a single factor model, where                   . In the model,     represent 
firm-specific expected return,     is the market return, and     is a mean zero error term. The beta coefficients (  ) are 
estimated for each separate firm using returns 5 and 3 years prior to the first mention date. We require the firm-specific 
expected return to equal zero in the cross section (i.e. CAPM). The estimates are next used to estimate daily abnormal 
returns (   ) using a residual approach, where                         . Market returns are estimated by using the 
daily CRSP equally-weighted return index, and are time-matched on a daily basis to each separate firm in the sample. 
Characteristic Mean Median Mean Median
Estimated beta (β)
  3 to 5 years prior 0.98 0.86 1.02 0.82 0.7255 0.3360 0.2270
  1 to 5 years prior 1.11 1.00 1.07 1.02 0.7481 0.7770 0.6498
Yearly stock return volatility
  3 to 5 years prior 45.4% 44.8% 51.0% 46.9% 0.1719 0.3690 0.0555 *
  1 to 5 years prior 51.3% 48.4% 57.6% 54.3% 0.0455 ** 0.0250 ** 0.0261 **
(* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
Mean
86 succsessful 
restructurings
132 unsuccsessful 
restructurings
Mean Median
Wilcoxon rank-sum test           
(p-value of z test)
One-tailed      
t-test
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in Table 10 confirm that stock return volatility is significantly higher for firms that go 
bankrupt, even after these factors are accounted for. 
Table 10: OLS regression of volatility determinants   
 
Results of ordinary-least-square regressions with volatility as the dependent variable. As independent variables 
we use a dummy variable for restructuring outcome, beta and year. Beta and volatility are measured over two 
different time periods measured in years prior to the first mention of a firm’s restructuring attempt. The table 
shows the coefficients of the regression result and p-values. 
 
Source: The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
These findings seem to imply that the firms in our sample that restructure privately 
exhibit lower idiosyncratic risk, on average, than the firms that enter bankruptcy. This must 
be the case since total risk, measured by volatility, is lower for the out-of-court sample, 
while there is no difference in systematic risk, measured by beta. The result is robust even 
when volatility and betas are measured several years prior to the time when the firms first 
enter financial distress. We can tie this directly to hypothesis H4 which states that more 
volatile stock returns are correlated with a lower probability of completing a successful 
private workout because volatility is a proxy for the degree of asymmetric information 
between a firm and its creditors. In fact, idiosyncratic risk is closer linked to asymmetric 
information and the analysis above demonstrates that such risk is significantly higher for 
firms whose private restructuring attempts are unsuccessful. Asymmetric information 
impedes private restructuring efforts because creditors may suspect that owners and 
managers have incentives to overstate the true value of the firm. Creditors may therefore 
prefer a court-supervised restructuring in cases with high informational asymmetries, since 
this entails greater information disclosure compared to an out-of-court restructuring 
(Hotchkiss et al., 2008).  
Table 8 also shows that the firms that restructure privately are generally younger 
than the firms that file for bankruptcy. One explanation for the age difference is that older 
firms are more likely to have developed complex organizational and financial structures. This 
complexity can add to coordination problems between creditors and make private 
Variable R-Squared
Volatility 3 to 5 years prior -0.081 *** -0.054 *** 0.136 *** - 0.0004 *** 0.8572
Volatility 1 to 5 years prior -0.095 *** -0.062 *** - 0.114 *** 0.0005 *** 0.8794
(* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
Successful 
restructuring
Ln(Assets)
Beta 3 to 5 
years prior
Beta 1 to 5 
years prior
Year
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restructuring more cumbersome. Even though the age difference between the subsamples is 
significant, age is also highly correlated with size, which is probably a better proxy for 
organizational complexity.  
Finally, firms that restructure their debt privately require an average of 139 days, 
compared to 161 days for firms that go bankrupt, to complete the restructuring attempt. 
This difference is significant at the 1% level. The time spent restructuring is measured from 
the first public mention of a firm’s restructuring attempt until the last public mention, or the 
bankruptcy filing date.16 Firms that file for bankruptcy spend an additional 456 days, on 
average, in bankruptcy court before they reemerge. These results are consistent with our 
prediction that bankruptcy cases are more time consuming, and presumably more 
expensive, than private workouts.    
While Table 8 compares different characteristics of the two subsamples, Table 11 
provides an overview of how each variable in the analysis correlates with the others. The 
results are mostly consistent with the univariate findings and with what we would expect 
based on the theoretical discussion in Section 2. Firstly, we note that the CDS variable is 
positively and significantly correlated with firm size, but negatively and significantly 
correlated with the level of bank financing. These results are reasonable given that CDS 
contracts mostly reference the public debt of larger corporations (LCDSs are an exception). 
Table 11 also concludes that, on the basis of a univariate analysis, we are unable to find any 
correlation between restructuring outcome and the presence of credit default swaps 
(hypothesis H1). Moreover, the level of public financing is positively and significantly 
correlated with firm size. Bank financing is also significantly correlated with the size variable, 
but with the opposite sign. These findings are reasonable given that larger firms should be 
expected to have better access to public financing, while smaller firms are more dependent 
on banks and other private lenders to finance their operations (Tirole, 2006). We also find a 
negative and significant correlation between firm size and the number of private financing 
contracts.   
The correlations between firm size and risk also confirm our previous findings. Firm 
size is negatively correlated with stock return volatility and the result is significant at the 5%  
                                                     
16
 The empirical distribution of time spent restructuring is truncated at 30 days in our sample, since the restructuring period 
for firms that only have a single public mention has been set to 30 days by default during the sampling.   
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Table 11: Correlation matrix  
 
Sources: The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) , EDGAR (SEC) Database,  Lynn M. LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, Standard & Poor’s Compustat Database, Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) Ln(Assets) 1.0000
(2) Liabilities/Assets 0.0193 1.0000
(0.7766)
(3) Public/Liabilities 0.1522 -0.0354 1.0000
(0.0246) ** -0.6034
(4) Bank/Liabilities -0.2445 -0.1119 -0.2521 1.0000
(0.0003) *** -0.0994 * -0.0002 ***
(5) Accountspay./Liabilities -0.0816 -0.1357 -0.2268 -0.0463 1.0000
(0.2301) -0.0454 ** -0.0007 *** -0.4966
(6) Numberoffin./Liabilities -0.5593 -0.1905 -0.1243 0.1898 0.0275 1.0000
0.0000 *** -0.0048 *** -0.0669 * -0.0049 *** -0.6866
(7) Numberofdebt/Liabilities -0.0509 -0.0414 0.4434 -0.0910 -0.1725 -0.0645 1.0000
(0.4543) -0.5436 0.0000 *** -0.1807 -0.0107 ** -0.3432
(8) Numberofprivate/Liabilities -0.2961 -0.1251 -0.1593 0.0521 0.1672 0.3250 -0.0833 1.0000
0.0000 *** -0.0652 * -0.0186 ** -0.4441 -0.0134 ** 0.0000 *** -0.2207
(9) CDS 0.5499 0.0274 0.0747 -0.1840 -0.1194 -0.2478 0.0031 -0.1061 1.0000
0.0000 *** -0.6872 -0.2723 -0.0064 *** -0.0785 * -0.0002 *** -0.9638 -0.1183
(10) P/B EV (2-year average) -0.1479 -0.0570 0.0463 0.0506 0.0688 -0.0021 0.0733 -0.0042 -0.1397 1.0000
-0.0290 ** -0.4025 -0.4962 -0.4571 -0.3118 -0.9755 -0.2815 -0.9508 -0.0393 **
(11) Beta (3 - 5 years prior) 0.0787 0.0158 0.1245 -0.1624 -0.0508 -0.0501 0.1339 -0.0747 0.0827 0.0634 1.0000
-0.2707 -0.8251 -0.0805 * -0.0223 ** -0.4775 -0.4829 -0.0599 * -0.2953 -0.2467 -0.3745
(12) Volatility (3 - 5 years prior) -0.1531 0.0242 0.0928 -0.0035 -0.0470 0.1599 0.1098 0.0705 -0.1091 0.1641 0.1777 1.0000
-0.0238 ** -0.7227 -0.1720 -0.9585 -0.4897 -0.0181 ** -0.1060 -0.2999 -0.1083 -0.0153 ** -0.0122 **
(13) Out-of-court -0.1149 -0.1545 -0.1676 0.1273 0.0077 0.2076 -0.0267 0.1811 0.0198 0.1063 -0.0318 -0.0277 1.0000
-0.0905 * -0.0225 ** -0.0132 ** -0.0606 * -0.9098 -0.0021 *** -0.6952 -0.0073 *** -0.7709 -0.1175 -0.6563 -0.6846
(* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
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level. Beta, on the other hand, is uncorrelated with firm size, which indicates that 
idiosyncratic risk decreases with size. The fact that firm-specific risk is lower for bigger firms 
can be explained as the result of two distinct mechanisms. Firstly, the risk of a larger firm 
should be expected to be lower per se, since larger firms are often more diversified and 
better established in the markets that they operate in. Secondly, informational asymmetries 
should also be expected to decrease with firm size since monitoring and bonding cost as a 
share of the total firm value is likely to exhibit economies of scale (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). A larger firm should therefore be expected to be subject to more scrutiny from 
external analyst, as well as be expected to offer greater disclosure to outside investors. 
5.2 Multivariate regression analysis 
The analysis in the previous section provides evidence that the firms in the two 
subsamples differ with regards to the empirical proxies we use to test the hypotheses that 
we formed in Section 3. In most cases the results support our predictions on how credit 
insurance, firm value, creditor conflicts and asymmetric information will affect the choice 
between bankruptcy and private debt renegotiation. Testing one variable at a time, 
however, disregards the marginal influence that an explanatory variable can have on the 
restructuring decision, given a firm’s other characteristics. In order to test the ceteris paribus 
effect of our independent variables we therefore employ probit regressions that relate the 
probability of a successful private renegotiation to our proxies and other control variables.  
In the probit models, the dependent variable equals one for a firm that successfully 
completes an out-of-court restructuring and zero if the restructuring attempt fails and the 
firm files for Chapter 11. A positive sign on the coefficient of an independent variable 
therefore suggests that the probability of a private workout increases with the size of that 
variable. The independent variables used in the regression are the same as the ones 
presented in the previous section and should be familiar. Unless otherwise specified, the 
variables are calculated using market and balance sheet data that most closely predate the 
beginning of a company’s restructuring effort. These values best capture a firm’s financial 
and operating condition prior to the restructuring.  
 Table 12 shows maximum-likelihood estimates for several probit regression models. 
In Model 1 we have included all proxy variables that we would expect to influence the 
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dependent variable. The control variable for firm size, the natural logarithm of total assets, 
has no influence on the results. This variable is therefore removed in Model 2, along with the 
number of public debt contracts divided by total liabilities, which is also insignificant. The 
price-book and volatility variables requires up to five years of data prior to the first mention 
date, and we are therefore not able to calculate this variable for all firms in the sample. The 
first two models address this problem by only including firms where these measures are 
found, thus making 169 observations available. Model 3 excludes the price/book and 
volatility variables, which raises the number of observations to 218. Model 4 is a selection of 
the independent variables with the highest explanatory power, and also excludes the CDS 
variable.   
First and foremost, we find no evidence for hypothesis H1 that the presence of credit 
default swaps on a firm’s debt reduces the likelihood of a successful private restructuring. 
The effect of credit insurance is insignificant in all our regressions. One reason for this result 
is that our proxy variable may not adequately capture the implications of the hypothesis that 
we wish to test. Ideally we would like to measure the proportion of a firm’s creditors’ debt 
holdings that are insured by CDS. Such information is, however, not publicly disclosed. 
Neither is it possible to obtain trading data on the notional amounts of CDS outstanding on a 
firm’s debt dating back more than one year.17 The dummy variable that we employ in our 
regressions may simply be too broad a measure to pick up any effect that credit insurance 
has on the negotiations between creditors and debtors.  
Another possible explanation is that our sample is too small to capture any 
systematic differences that CDS make, or that we have inadequately adjusted for other and 
more important factors. Although one should be careful to interpret the explanatory powers 
of a regression, pseudo R-squared measures in our model are about 20%, which suggests 
that there are other factors that may be critical to the success of a private renegotiation. 
Some of these factors may be either unsystematic or impossible to quantify (e.g. the relative 
bargaining abilities and personalities of the parties involved).18 A final possibility is simply 
                                                     
17
 The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) reports trading data, but only dating one year back. Creditex and 
Markit also provide some data, but only for actual credit events.  
18
 The presence of other explanatory variable is in effect an endogeneity problem (omitted variable bias), which we discuss 
in more detail below 
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that the empty creditor hypothesis is unfounded and that we cannot observe the 
phenomenon in practice. 
The regressions do, however, lend support to hypothesis H2 which states that firms 
with higher going-concern values are more likely to restructure privately. The enterprise 
price-book variable, measured as a two-year average, is significant in all the regressions (p-
value of 0.000) and has the expected sign. This variable is likely to separate between firms 
based on their expected loss of value within bankruptcy, assuming that price-book measures 
the degree to which a company’s assets are intangible or generate firm-specific rents. Such 
firms have more to lose in bankruptcy proceedings which are often invasive and increase the 
likelihood of asset sales.  
Table 12: Multivariate probit regressions 
 
Probit regressions with dependent variable equal to one if a firm successfully restructures privately and zero 
otherwise. The table reports marginal effects and p-values for four different variations of the main model. 
Liabilities/Assets is the book value of total liabilities over total assets taken from Compustat. 
Accountspay./Liabilities is the amount of outstanding trade credit divided by total liabilities, also from 
Compustat. Numberofdebt. and Numberofprivate refers to the total number of individual financing contracts the 
firm holds and the number of private financing contracts, respectively. The number of contracts is taken from 
10-K and 8-Q reports found in the EDGAR (SEC) online database. CDS is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm 
has CDS traded on its debt. Information on CDS is taken from Datastream. P/B EV is the market value of equity 
and book value of liabilities divided by the book value of equity and liabilities. This variable is measured as a 
two-year average prior to the first mention date. Volatility is measured as the volatility in daily stock returns 
over a period 3-5 years prior to a firm’s restructuring attempt. Price data is taken from CRSP. Year marks the 
year of the beginning of a firm’s restructuring effort.  
 
dF/dx p-value dF/dx p-value dF/dx p-value dF/dx p-value
Ln(Assets) 0.001 (0.976)
Liabilities/Assets -0.471 (0.004) *** -0.478 (0.003) *** -0.219 (0.027) ** -0.502 (0.002) ***
Public/Liabilities -0.399 (0.049) ** -0.369 (0.041) ** -0.293 (0.036) ** -0.403 (0.023) **
Accountspay./Liabilities -0.760 (0.014) ** -0.771 (0.012) ** -0.333 (0.147) -0.720 (0.018) **
Numberofdebt./Liabilities 0.095 (0.714)
Numberofprivate./Liabilities 0.167 (0.012) ** 0.167 (0.005) *** 0.059 (0.022) ** 0.162 (0.004) ***
CDS -0.020 (0.876) -0.023 (0.839) -0.018 (0.853)
P/B EV (2-year average) 0.187 0.000 *** 0.189 0.000 *** 0.180 0.000 ***
Volatility (3 - 5 years prior) -0.348 (0.108) -0.346 (0.102)
Year 0.028 (0.034) ** 0.029 (0.028) ** 0.028 (0.008) *** 0.032 (0.007) ***
N 169 169 218 170
Adjusted-R2 0.2190 0.2180 0.1080 0.2030
χ2 50.23 (0.000) *** 50.09 (0.000) *** 31.52 (0.000) *** 46.75 (0.000) ***
Log Likelihood -89.5 -89.6 -130.5 -91.8
(* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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We also find evidence for hypothesis H3, which states that creditor conflicts decrease 
the likelihood of a private workout, and that they manifest themselves as expected. Public 
debt is usually more difficult to restructure privately due to legal clauses that require 
unanimous consent to change the core terms of a bond, and holdout problems among 
dispersed ownership groups. Public debt over total liabilities is significant at the five percent 
level in all the regressions and impacts the likelihood of a private restructuring negatively. 
We find no evidence that the number of public debt contracts as a share of total liabilities 
influences the restructuring decision, but a higher portion of private debt contracts does 
increase the likelihood of avoiding Chapter 11. As an alternative measure we could have 
employed a proxy for the portion of bank debt. This variable is naturally correlated with the 
portion of public debt, but in other regressions not presented here the portion of bank debt 
is significant at the 5% level and increases the probability of a successful out-of-court 
restructuring.19 This is consistent with our predictions that bank lenders are easier to reach a 
private solution with than public lenders. 
Our other proxies for the severity of creditor conflicts also carry the expected signs. 
We assume that trade debt is difficult to restructure privately because trade creditors are 
often more numerous and smaller in size, which can lead to a higher degree of holdout 
problems. The amount of trade credit over total liabilities, which we use as a proxy for the 
importance of trade credit, is significant at the 5% level in all the regressions, except Model 
3, and its coefficient is negative. Furthermore, our leverage variable, measured as the book 
value of total liabilities over assets, indicates that firms with higher leverage find a private 
restructuring less likely. This is consistent with our hypothesis that higher leverage 
exacerbates conflicts between creditors with different seniority. 
The regressions do not, however, lend particularly strong support for hypothesis H4 
that asymmetric information between the firm and its creditors increases the chances of 
bankruptcy. We use the volatility of firms’ stock returns three to five years prior to the 
restructuring attempt as a proxy for informational asymmetry. This variable is not significant 
at the 10% level, although it does carry the expected sign. Nonetheless, in the previous 
section we already tested and found a significant difference in the volatility of the stock 
                                                     
19
 For example a probit model with 1 = successful private restructuring and 0 = failed private restructuring and with 
independent variables: liabilities over assets, bank debt as a portion of liabilities, CDS, year and enterprise price-book yields 
a positive coefficient and a p-value = 0.036 for the bank debt variable 
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returns between our two subsamples. This result was robust even after we accounted for 
firm size, systematic risk measured by beta and year. So while the marginal effect of 
volatility is not very strong in our probit regressions we still have evidence supporting the 
fact that firms that restructure out of court generally exhibit less volatile stock returns than 
the bankruptcy candidates.  
If we also interpret the portion of bank debt as a proxy for the information 
asymmetry problem, then the regressions do support hypothesis H4. As we already 
mentioned, the bank debt variable is significant in other regressions and is higher for firms 
that restructure privately. This is conducive to hypothesis H4 because bank lenders generally 
perform a good monitoring role and bank debt comes with strict covenants. However, we 
have also suggested that bank debt may be a proxy for the severity of the holdout problem, 
and our regressions do not allow us to separate between these two effects.  
5.3 Endogeneity concerns 
One of the most important assumptions of the regression analyses in the previous 
section is that the regressors used in the models are exogenous. This assumption requires 
the independent variables to be uncorrelated with the error term in the regression model 
(Woolridge, 2009), which may not be true for several reasons. Firstly, endogeneity problems 
can arise due to reverse causation. Reverse causation implies that the independent variables 
may in fact be determined simultaneously with, or as a function of, the dependent variable. 
Secondly, endogeneity problems may occur if relevant explanatory variables are omitted 
from the model, meaning that the causal relationship that is estimated by the model is also 
dependent on one or more factors that are not included in the regression. Finally, 
endogeneity problems can be the result of sampling errors. If these issues are left 
unchecked, it may lead to an unbiased and inconsistent regression result. 
In our case, the biggest endogeneity concerns are related to reverse causation and 
omitted variables. Problems with reverse causation can be relevant if financing decisions and 
capital structure choices are based on expectations of future restructuring outcomes. For 
example, firms may expect their restructuring prospects to be better if they rely more 
heavily on bank financing than public debt, and will attempt to alter their capital structure 
accordingly ex ante. By the same token, capital structure decisions may also be affected by 
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creditors’ expectations of a restructuring outcome.  If lending choices are influenced by how 
creditors assess a firm’s chances of restructuring privately or entering bankruptcy it may 
affect the leverage variables that we use in the regressions (Liabilities/Assets, 
Public/Liabilities and Accountspay./Liabilities).  
Reverse causation may also be a problem if market expectations of the restructuring 
outcome affect the price of debt and equity securities issued by a firm. This may result in an 
endogeneity problem for the price/book variable that we use in the regressions. Finally, and 
important in the context of empty creditors, lenders’ choice of credit protection, through the 
purchase of CDS contracts, may be endogenously affected by their expectations of future 
distress and the likely outcome of a renegotiation of the debt issued by the reference entity. 
We would expect the latter problem to be more severe for our regression results if we had 
used a continuous variable based on notional amount outstanding instead of a binary 
variable.   
Our regression models may also be fraught with endogeneity problems related to 
omitted variables if there are unobserved factors, for which we have no relevant proxies, 
that affect the restructuring outcome. One example of such a factor is the nature of the 
relationship between management and creditors and the relative bargaining strengths of 
both parties.  
One way to check for and potentially correct endogeneity problems is to use a two-
stage instrumental variable (IV) estimator. A two-stage IV model can be performed by first 
regressing each potentially endogenous variable in separate reduced-form models. In each 
reduced-form model the endogenous variable is estimated using a selection of instrument 
variables, as well as variables that can be assumed to be exogenous. The instrument 
variables are variables that are correlated with the endogenous covariates and at the same 
time uncorrelated with the error term in the original structural model. Next, the fitted 
residuals from each of the reduced-form models are regressed in the original structural 
probit model. One can then test whether the variables in the original regression are 
endogenous using a multiple linear exclusion restriction, where the null hypothesis states 
that all the regression coefficients of the predicted residuals from the reduced-form models 
simultaneously equal zero in the structural model. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the 
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problem can be corrected by replacing the endogenous variables in the structural model 
with the predicted values from the reduced-form models.  
The most crucial aspect of the two-stage IV estimator procedure is to identify 
appropriate instrument variables that are both relevant and exogenous. Firstly, each 
instrumental variable must have predicative power on one or more of the potentially 
endogenous variables in the reduced-form regressions. If this condition is not upheld, we say 
that the instrumental variables are weak. In that case, the predictions based on the second 
stage structural model will be poor, since the reduced-form models will inadequately predict 
the variability in the endogenous regressors. At the same time, all instruments must be 
exogenous, meaning that they are uncorrelated with the error term in the main regression. 
If this condition is breached, the IV estimation is inconsistent and the endogeneity problem 
will persist. The problem of identifying instrument variables that satisfy both the conditions 
to be relevant and exogenous becomes harder as the number of potentially endogenous 
variable increases, since the procedure demands at least one instrument for each 
endogenous regressor.  
In our case, if we assume that all the variables except Year in Model 3 and 4 are 
potentially endogenous, then we must identify at least five instrument variables in order to 
estimate a two-stage IV model. We recognize that it is difficult to identify this many 
instrument variables and that this poses a severe limitation to the effectiveness of the IV 
approach in our context. Nonetheless, we have illustrated the procedure for a two-stage IV 
probit regression based on Model 4 where we try to investigate whether endogeneity 
problems are present.  
To perform the regression we have chosen the following instrument variables. Firstly, 
we use dummy variables that represent sector affiliation, defined by the two first digits in 
the firm’s GICS code, in order to instrument the variables Public/Liabilities, 
Accountspay./Liabilities, and Numberofprivate./Liabilities. There are 11 sectors in total, from 
which we select dummy variables for the sectors Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, and 
Information Technology. Although we observe some differences in restructuring outcomes 
across sectors, we see from Table 6 that outcomes are fairly evenly distributed for the three 
sectors selected as instruments. In addition, sector affiliation should not be expected to be 
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associated with reverse causation (e.g. a firm cannot be expected to change its sector based 
on expectations of future restructuring outcomes). The selected sector instrument variables 
should therefore be expected to be exogenous. At the same time we would expect sector 
affiliation to have high predictive power on capital structure choices, for example on the 
level of public financing and working capital (accounts payable).  
Next, we have included firm age, defined as the time from IPO or major merger to 
the first mention date of a firm’s restructuring attempt, as an instrument variable. One can 
argue that this variable is likely to be uncorrelated with the restructuring outcome, as older 
firms should not be more or less prone to bankruptcy. At the same time it can be argued 
that age is correlated with the price/book variable since older firms are generally larger or 
more mature and trade at lower price/book multiples because they have fewer growth 
opportunities.  
Finally, we have included as instruments the book values of total capital (debt and 
equity), and leverage (debt over total capital) two years prior to the restructuring. The total 
capital variable must by construction be correlated with firm size, and therefore also the 
price/book variable, since a large firm is likely to remain so two years later. The leverage 
variable should be correlated with the leverage measures in the structural model, since 
capital structure choices should be expected to be firm-specific and lagging in the sense that 
they are unlikely to change abruptly. At the same time, both the total capital and leverage 
measures are likely to be uncorrelated with the restructuring outcome as they are sampled 
from the firms’ balance sheets at least two years prior to the first mention of a restructuring 
attempt taking place. The variable year is kept as an exogenous variable and left in the 
structural model without any reduced-form estimation.  
The results from the two-step IV estimation are shown in Appendix D. The first five 
models contain the reduced form equations for each of the possibly endogenous variables, 
and the last model shows estimates for the structural model based on Model 4 (Table 12). 
The p-value of the chi-square test operator under the null hypothesis is equal to 0.7299, 
which means we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that our regressors are 
uncorrelated with the error term in the original equation. However, we must emphasize that 
this conclusion is not particularly strong. We observe that the reduced-form models have 
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very low predictive power, and that the significance of the endogenous variables in the 
second stage structural model all but disappears. This result stands in contrast to those of 
the original regression in Model 4, where all regressors are significant at the 5% level.  This 
would seem to indicate that the instruments used are weak and we must therefore conclude 
that any (potential) endogeneity problems inherent in our analysis remain unsolved. 
6. Conclusion 
This study analyses the debt restructuring attempts of 218 financially distressed firms 
between 1995 and 2010. 86 firms in our sample successfully complete an out-of-court 
restructuring while 132 firms end up filing for bankruptcy after a private restructuring had 
failed. Our principal interest has been to determine whether firms that have credit insurance 
outstanding on their debt will systematically be more inclined to end up in bankruptcy than 
firms that do not have credit insurance. According to legal scholars Hu and Black (2008b), 
such insurance can give rise to empty creditors that have more to gain from a debt 
restructuring within bankruptcy. Our study, however, finds no evidence that the existence of 
credit insurance on a firm’s debt influences the debt restructuring decision. Even after 
adjusting for capital structure effects, potential holdout problems among creditors and other 
factors, the effect of CDS contracts remains insignificant.  
Nonetheless, we find support for several of our other hypotheses regarding firms’ 
choice between private renegotiation and bankruptcy. Our results show that financial 
distress is more likely to be resolved privately when firms have higher going-concern values, 
as measured by their price-to-book value, and owe more debt to banks and private lenders. 
A private restructuring is less likely to succeed when more debt is owed to public lenders 
and trade creditors, when leverage is high and when there is higher information asymmetry 
between a firm and its creditors.  
Our study also provides stock price evidence which suggests that the market treats 
successful private restructurings more favorably than bankruptcy. Cumulative abnormal 
stock returns for firms that complete an out-of-court restructuring are significantly higher 
than for the firms that file for Chapter 11 in our sample. This finding is consistent with the 
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notion that bankruptcy is generally more costly than private renegotiation. On average, 
stockholders therefore have an incentive to avoid bankruptcy and settle out of court.  
The ex-post empirical approach that we have adopted in this paper to test the empty 
creditor hypothesis highlights the difficulty of drawing concrete conclusions about a market 
that is inherently non-transparent. Empty creditors may well be a problem, but the lack of 
public information and disclosure precludes observation and conclusive testing of the issue 
in practice. There is a current debate about moving CDS contracts to organized exchanges 
(Duffie and Zhu, 2009) that also encourages more transparency and greater disclosure 
requirements on CDS positions. At the very least, such action would allow the public to 
gauge creditors’ incentives when a firm lands in financial distress. Bolton and Oehmke 
(2010), whose research we have drawn on in this paper, suggests disclosure before other 
more interventionalist measures such as stripping empty creditors of their voting rights or 
making restructurings a credit event. This view weighs the potential problems of CDS with 
their benefit as a commitment device that encourages lending and investment.  
The issue is important because it is likely to influence regulatory action in the near 
future. Further research on the empty creditor issue is therefore warranted. An 
improvement to our own analysis could be made by incorporating trading data on the 
amounts of outstanding CDS on a firm’s debt. Such data is becoming available through the 
records of the major OTC clearing houses such as The Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC).  
Another interesting extension could be to test some of the ex ante results predicted 
by Bolton and Oehmke’s (2010) limited commitment model. One of the predictions of the 
model is that creditors’ incentive to over-insure in equilibrium increases with the probability 
of a high cash flow in the last period of the model, especially if this probability is high 
compared to the verification cost. A practical implication of this statement could be that 
creditors of firms with high cash flow generating capabilities and relatively high earnings 
visibility will be more prone to over-insure. Testing if that is the case would offer new insight 
into the empty creditor hypothesis and would have the additional advantage of increasing 
the potential sample size. The reason is that we could then test for the empty creditor 
problem ex ante, and not be restricted by firms that have undergone restructurings ex post.  
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In practical terms, one could compare the amount of gross notional outstanding CDS 
contracts on a firm’s debt, which is now available from DTCC on a weekly basis for the 1,000 
largest reference entities, against some proxy for the cash-generating characteristics and 
associated verification cost of the firm (after adjusting for other factors). Further work could 
also be done to extend the model proposed by Bolton and Oehmke (2010). Natural 
extensions could be to determine the effect of different firm characteristics on creditors’ 
choice of credit protection, including such variables as a firm’s asset tangibility, risk profile 
and product market characteristics.     
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7. Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Detailed company description 
Out-of-court sample 
 
 
 
COMPUSTAT NAME First mention date Last mention date Type of restructuring Asset size (USDm) 3-year Stock Return CDS
Abraxas Petroleum Corp. 12/06/2000 12/07/2000 Exchange offer 322 -0.9023 No
Accredited Home Lenders Hldg. 13/03/2007 20/04/2007 Covenant waiver/amendment 11,349 -0.4162 No
Adaptec Inc. 04/09/1999 16/05/2000 Credit facility refinanced 109 -0.6696 No
Advocat Inc. 16/12/2003 22/01/2004 Exchange offer 1,103 -0.5001 No
AES Corp. 01/04/1999 24/11/1999 Refinancing and covenant waiver 121 -0.2903 No
Ambac Financial Group 05/01/2002 30/12/2003 Refinancing and maturity extension 36,736 -0.7214 Yes
Amcore Financial Inc. 20/11/2008 20/12/2008 Forbearance agreement 23,565 -0.6668 Yes
Apria Healthcare Group Inc. 26/09/2009 18/12/2009 Covenant waiver/amendment 5,060 -0.8880 No
Avanex Corp. 23/10/1998 30/03/1999 Covenant waiver/amendment and restructuring of credit facility 757 -0.5502 No
Avis Budget Group 02/05/2005 01/06/2005 Unkown 273 0.5685 No
Balanced Care Corp. 28/10/2008 26/05/2009 Exchange offer and maturity extension 12,474 Yes
Beazer Homes USA Inc. 16/02/2001 08/05/2001 Exchange offer and maturity extension 120 -0.7705 No
Blockbuster Inc. 07/07/2007 29/10/2007 Covenant waiver/amendment 4,559 -0.6023 Yes
Buca Inc. 03/03/2009 02/03/2010 Exchange offer 2,155 -0.7662 Yes
Calamp Corp. 19/11/2003 18/04/2005 Covenant waiver/amendment 217 -0.4800 No
Charming Shoppes Inc. 16/10/2002 15/11/2002 Maturity extension 57 -0.8591 No
Checkers Drive-In Restaurant 02/10/1995 05/12/1995 Refinancing and maturity extension of credit facility 841 -0.6531 No
Citizens Republic Bancorp 22/07/1996 25/11/1996 Maturity extension 167 -0.9243 No
CKE Restaurants Inc. 26/06/2009 26/07/2009 Exchange offer 13,086 No
Clean Harbors Inc. 20/01/2001 18/04/2001 Covenant waiver/amendment 1,214 -0.8895 No
Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp. 21/03/2003 14/08/2003 Covenant waiver/amendment 560 7.2987 No
Cogent Communications Group 29/06/2001 08/04/2002 Exchange offer 595 -0.2606 No
Comfort Systems USA Inc. 20/06/2003 20/07/2003 Exchange offer 408 No
Comstock Homebuilding Companies 18/11/2000 18/12/2000 Maturity extension 926 -0.8910 No
Comstock Homebuilding Companies 25/10/2006 29/12/2006 Forbearance agreement 259 -0.9530 No
Consumer Portfolio Services Inc. 10/03/2008 17/02/2010 Maturity extension 431 No
Credit Acceptance Corp. 05/11/1999 24/03/2000 Covenant waiver/amendment 432 -0.7182 No
Darling International Inc. 15/12/1997 31/07/1998 Covenant waiver/amendment and maturity extension 1,116 -0.6265 No
Delta Petroleum Corp. 19/11/1998 01/02/1999 Covenant waiver/amendment and maturity extension 313 -0.6566 No
Dixie Group Inc. 30/09/2009 30/10/2009 Covenant waiver/amendment 1,895 -0.8416 No
Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group 15/06/2001 20/11/2001 Covenant waiver/amendment and refinancing 423 -0.7077 No
Dynegy Inc. 30/09/2008 30/10/2008 Covenant waiver/amendment 3,891 -0.3682 No
Dynex Capital Inc. 03/04/2003 28/07/2003 Covenant waiver/amendment and maturity extension 20,030 -0.9740 Yes
El Paso Corp. 21/09/1999 20/05/2000 Covenant waiver/amendment 5,179 No
Fibernet Telecom Group Inc. 17/04/2003 17/05/2003 Refinancing and maturity extension of credit facility 46,224 Yes
Firstcity Financial Corp. 12/08/2002 31/10/2002 Exchange offer 137 No
Foster Wheeler AG 13/08/1999 23/05/2000 Covenant waiver/amendment 1,664 -0.5500 No
Gilat Sattelite Networks Ltd. 15/04/2002 16/03/2005 Covenant waiver/amendment, exhcange offer, and maturity extension 3,316 -0.4868 No
Headwaters Inc. 18/09/2002 06/03/2003 Exchange offer 859 -0.9417 No
Isle of Capri Casino Inc. 29/06/2009 29/07/2009 Covenant waiver/amendment and maturity extension 1,402 -0.3924 No
Key Tronic Corp. 15/03/1999 14/04/1999 Covenant waiver/amendment 676 1.3726 No
Lee Enterprises Inc. 21/12/2001 20/01/2002 Covenant waiver/amendment 74 -0.6076 No
Level 3 Communications Inc. 17/01/2009 20/02/2009 Refinancing and covenant waiver/amendment 2,016 -0.8599 No
Lodgenet Interactive Corp. 31/12/2008 22/06/2009 Exchange offer 9,638 -0.8736 Yes
Maguire Properties Inc. 12/08/2003 11/09/2003 Covenant waiver/amendment 298 -0.3219 No
Manugistics Group Inc. 18/06/2009 23/03/2010 Covenant waiver/amendment and maturity extension 5,199 -0.9650 No
McClatchy Co. 23/09/2004 23/10/2004 Covenant waiver/amendment and maturity extension 498 -0.5849 No
Meridian Resource Corp. 21/05/2009 27/01/2010 Exchange offer 3,522 -0.9811 Yes
Meristar Hospitatlity Corp. 16/04/2003 30/07/2003 Covenant waiver/amendment 456 -0.8531 No
Moduslink Global Solutions 22/09/2003 22/10/2003 Exchange offer 2,798 -0.6583 No
Moneygram International Inc. 30/10/2001 09/12/2001 Exchange offer 8,557 -0.5295 No
Nabi Biopharmaceuticals 31/01/2008 01/03/2008 Covenant waiver/amendment 7,935 -0.4347 No
Nautilus Inc. 30/03/1998 29/04/1998 Covenant waiver/amendment 226 No
Navarre Corp. 22/02/2008 23/03/2008 Forbearance agreement 391 -0.7443 No
Navisite Inc. 19/10/2005 18/11/2005 Covenant waiver/amendment 196 3.8773 No
NCI Building Systems Inc. 15/12/2000 14/01/2001 Covenant waiver/amendment 175 No
OM Group Inc. 10/09/2009 26/10/2009 Exchange offer 1,381 -0.6806 No
Party City Corp. 22/07/2004 21/08/2004 Covenant waiver/amendment 1,211 -0.5914 No
Perma-Fix Environmental Services 19/03/1999 29/11/1999 Covenant waiver/amendment 158 -0.7279 No
PMI Group Inc. 08/04/2008 08/05/2008 Covenant waiver/amendment 126 0.5061 No
Protection One Inc. 01/06/2009 01/07/2009 Covenant waiver/amendment 4,824 -0.9561 Yes
Qwest Communication International Inc. 15/11/2004 15/12/2004 Exchange offer 809 -0.8563 No
Radian Group Inc. 21/11/2002 30/12/2002 Exchange offer 73,781 -0.6048 Yes
Revlon Inc. 10/04/2008 10/05/2008 Covenant waiver/amendment 8,210 -0.7935 Yes
Revlon Inc. 16/12/2003 13/02/2004 Covenant waiver/amendment 889 -0.6014 No
John B. Sanfilippo & Son, Inc. 14/11/2008 09/11/2009 Exchange offer 892 -0.6889 No
Silverleaf Resorts Inc. 07/07/2007 06/08/2007 Covenant waiver/amendment 368 -0.4914 No
Sirius XM Radio Inc. 27/02/2001 02/05/2002 Exchange offer 468 -0.7409 No
Sirius XM Radio Inc. 07/03/2003 06/04/2003 Exchange offer 7,491 -0.9687 No
Sport Chalet Inc. 11/02/2009 28/03/2009 Exchange offer 1,341 -0.9766 No
Standard Pacific Corp. 02/03/2009 29/06/2009 Covenant waiver/amendment 151 -0.9814 No
Star Gas Partners 15/01/2008 30/06/2008 Exchange offer 3,401 -0.9107 Yes 
65 
 
 
 
In-court sample 
 
 
  
COMPUSTAT NAME First mention date Last mention date Type of restructuring Asset size (USDm) 3-year Stock Return CDS
Suncom Wireless Holdings Inc. 13/10/2004 05/12/2004 Covenant waiver/amendment 961 0.2199 No
Sunrise Senior Living Inc. 31/01/2007 08/03/2007 Exchange offer 1,655 Yes
Tecumseh Products Co. 29/07/2009 28/12/2009 Maturity extension 1,382 -0.9470 No
Tenet Healthcare Corp. 22/03/2007 10/05/2007 Covenant waiver/amendment 1,783 -0.6347 No
Transwitch Corp. 22/01/2009 03/11/2009 Exchange offer 8,174 -0.8416 Yes
TRC Cos. Inc. 16/05/2003 25/09/2003 Exchange offer 243 -0.8980 No
Unisys Corp. 13/01/2006 12/02/2006 Forbearance agreement/maturity extension 516 -0.1126 No
Ventas Inc. 30/04/2009 03/08/2009 Exchange offer 2,824 -0.8848 Yes
Westaff Inc. 01/11/1999 02/02/2000 Covenant waiver/amendment 960 -0.6264 No
Wyndham International Inc. 14/02/2008 18/02/2009 Forbearance agreement 141 -0.1618 No
Xerium Technologies Inc. 13/12/2001 25/01/2002 Covenant waiver/amendment 5,768 -0.7964 No
Xerox Corp. 11/11/2008 15/12/2009 Covenant waiver/amendment 891 -0.4064 No
YRC Worldwide Inc. 18/04/2002 01/08/2002 Refinancing and covenant waiver/amendment 27,689 -0.6002 Yes
COMPUSTAT NAME First mention date Bankruptcy date Type of restructuring Asset size (USDm) 3-year Stock Return CDS
aaiPharma Inc. 17/03/2005 10/05/2005 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 339 -0.9274 Yes
Abitibibowater Inc. 10/03/2008 16/04/2009 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 10,319 -0.7962 No
ACT Manufacturing, Inc. 21/11/2001 21/12/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,068 -0.3251 Yes
Adelphia Communications Corp. 22/05/2002 25/06/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 21,499 0.7500 No
Allegiance Telecom Inc. 27/11/2002 14/05/2003 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,775 0.4750 No
American Homestar Corp. 26/09/2000 11/01/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 362 -0.8822 No
American Pad & Paper Company 13/07/1998 10/01/2000 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 638 -0.9474 No
Ames Department Stores, Inc. (2001) 13/09/2000 20/08/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,975 No
AMF Bowling, Inc. 15/09/2000 03/07/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,827 0.3047 No
Amwest Insurance Group Inc. 15/08/2000 24/07/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 242 -0.8741 No
Applied Magnetics Corporation 18/08/1999 07/01/2000 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 300 -0.4867 No
APW Ltd. 31/03/2001 16/05/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,214 -0.7069 No
Asia Global Crossing, Ltd. 28/12/2001 17/11/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 3,633 No
Aurora Foods Inc. 27/02/2003 08/12/2003 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,251 No
Bally Total Fitness Holding Corporation (2007) 12/04/2007 31/07/2007 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 397 -0.6434 No
Bethlehem Steel Corp 20/06/2001 15/10/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 5,467 -0.3118 No
Birmingham Steel Corp. 27/03/2002 03/06/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 647 -0.7778 No
BMC Industries Inc. 01/07/2003 23/06/2004 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 247 -0.8151 No
Breed Technologies, Inc. 31/03/1999 20/09/1999 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,650 -0.7240 No
Builders Transport Inc. 25/02/1998 21/05/1998 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 340 -0.3449 No
Building Materials Holding Corporation 04/02/2008 16/06/2009 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 875 -0.8309 No
Champion Enterprises, Inc. 13/08/2009 15/11/2009 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 645 -0.9336 No
Chart Industries Inc. 08/04/2003 08/07/2003 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 279 -0.9445 No
Charter Communications, Inc 14/01/2009 27/03/2009 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 14,666 -0.8646 No
Chemtura Corporation 30/12/2008 18/03/2009 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 4,416 -0.0488 Yes
CHS Electronics, Inc. 16/08/1999 04/04/2000 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 3,572 -0.3664 Yes
CIT Group Inc. 01/10/2009 01/11/2009 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 80,449 0.0871 No
Citadel Broadcasting Corporation 05/06/2008 20/12/2009 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 3,843 -0.9143 Yes
Collins & Aikman 17/04/2005 17/05/2005 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 3,191 -0.8491 No
Conseco, Inc. 09/08/2002 17/12/2002 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  61,392 -0.5559 Yes
Covad Communications 08/07/2001 07/08/2001 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 1,511 -0.7831 No
Covanta Energy Corp. 01/03/2002 01/04/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 3,186 No
Crown Vantage Inc. 14/02/2000 15/03/2000 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 557 -0.6291 No
DaisyTek International Corp. 13/03/2003 07/05/2003 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 414 -0.7922 No
Dan River Inc. 19/12/2003 31/03/2004 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 596 -0.3345 No
Dana Corporation 01/02/2006 03/03/2006 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 7,386 0.2277 No
Dayton Superior Corporation 08/01/2009 19/04/2009 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 300 -0.5595 Yes
DDI Corp. 11/04/2003 20/08/2003 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  221 No
Delta Air Lines, Inc. 10/03/2005 14/09/2005 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  21,801 -0.9933 No
Dura Automotive Systems, Inc. 30/09/2006 30/10/2006 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  2,075 -0.4418 Yes
DVI Inc. 16/07/2003 25/08/2003 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,672 -0.7993 Yes
Encompass Services Corporation 01/10/2002 19/11/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 2,401 0.3544 No
Enron Corp. 02/11/2001 02/12/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 65,503 No
eToys, Inc. 26/01/2001 07/03/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 425 0.5183 Yes
Exide Technologies 05/01/2002 15/04/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 2,299 No
FairPoint Communications, Inc. 24/06/2009 26/10/2009 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 3,334 -1.0000 No
Family Golf Centers, Inc. 13/08/1999 04/05/2000 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 572 -0.8264 No
Farmland Industries, Inc. 01/05/2002 31/05/2002 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 2,728 -0.3389 No
FLAG Telecom Holdings, Ltd 13/03/2002 12/04/2002 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 3,477 No
FLYi, Inc. 16/02/2005 07/11/2005 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 678 No
Foamex International, Inc. (2005) 17/08/2005 19/09/2005 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 646 -0.8543 No
FPA Medical Management, Inc. 10/06/1998 19/07/1998 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 831 0.2789 No
Fremont General Corporation 04/03/2008 18/06/2008 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  12,891 2.1042 No
Fruit of the Loom, Inc. 15/10/1999 29/12/1999 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 2,290 -0.3137 No
General Growth Properties, Inc. 09/12/2008 16/04/2009 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  29,557 -0.6279 No
General Motors Corporation 21/04/2009 01/06/2009 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 91,039 -0.9765 Yes
Genuity Inc. 25/10/2002 27/11/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 2,994 -0.8910 Yes
Global Crossing Ltd. 28/12/2001 28/01/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 30,185 No
Guilford Mills, Inc. 11/02/2002 13/03/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 551 -0.6354 No
Hayes Lemmerz International, Inc. 11/04/2009 11/05/2009 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  1,096 -0.9131 No
Hines Horticulture, Inc. 04/06/2007 20/08/2008 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 340 -0.9770 Yes
Huntsman Polymers Corp 30/11/2001 27/02/2002 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  1,138 -0.5541 No
ICG Communications, Inc. 29/09/2000 14/11/2000 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 2,021 No
Imperial Sugar Company 14/12/2000 16/01/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,094 -0.2228 No
IMPSAT Fiber Networks, Inc. 11/03/2002 11/06/2002 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  719 No
Iridium LLC (and six subsidiaries) 29/03/1999 13/08/1999 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  3,739 No
JCC Holding Co. 23/08/2000 04/01/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 506 No
Kellstrom Industries, Inc. 06/04/2001 20/02/2002 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 573 No
Komag, Inc. 05/04/2001 24/08/2001 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 633 -0.9395 No
Laroche Industries Inc. 12/01/1999 03/05/2000 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 405 -0.9261 No
Lason, Inc. 02/06/2000 05/12/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 836 No
Lear Corporation 13/05/2009 07/07/2009 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 6,873 -0.6207 No
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COMPUSTAT NAME First mention date Bankruptcy date Type of restructuring Asset size (USDm) 3-year Stock Return CDS
Lenox Group, Inc. 14/02/2007 23/11/2008 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 374 -0.9532 Yes
Loews Cineplex Entertainment Corp 26/08/2000 15/02/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,678 No
Magellan Health Services Inc. 01/11/2002 11/03/2003 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,004 -0.9615 No
McLeodUSA Incorporated (2005) 17/03/2005 28/10/2005 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  1,026 -0.9133 No
McLeodUSA, Inc. (2002) 01/01/2002 31/01/2002 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 4,755 -0.7465 No
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. 01/04/2002 20/05/2002 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  6,252 -0.9916 No
Mirant Corp. 08/05/2003 14/07/2003 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 19,415 -0.9880 No
Monaco Coach Corporation 30/07/2008 05/03/2009 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 564 Yes
Movie Gallery, Inc. 05/07/2007 16/10/2007 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,153 -0.3850 No
Network Plus Corp. 02/01/2002 05/02/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 405 -0.8050 Yes
New World Pasta Co. 14/08/2003 10/05/2004 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 426 No
Northwestern Steel & Wire Co. 24/01/2000 19/12/2000 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 318 No
NTELOS, Inc. 29/11/2002 04/03/2003 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,197 -0.6905 No
Oglebay Norton Company 21/04/2003 23/02/2004 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 687 No
Orleans Homebuilders, Inc. 05/11/2009 01/03/2010 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 716 -0.7020 No
Outboard Marine Corporation 12/05/1999 22/12/2000 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,082 -0.8009 No
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 01/02/2001 06/04/2001 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  21,988 0.0667 No
Pacific Gateway Exchange, Inc. 16/05/2000 29/12/2000 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  375 -0.3762 Yes
Penn Traffic Co (2003) 31/10/2002 30/05/2003 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 806 -0.6055 No
Philip Services Corp. (1999) 13/11/1998 25/06/1999 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  1,148 -0.2483 No
Pilgrims Pride Corporation 29/09/2008 01/12/2008 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 3,298 -0.9825 No
Pillowtex Corp. (2000) 09/11/1999 14/11/2000 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,654 -0.8540 No
Pillowtex Corp. (2003) 28/03/2003 30/07/2003 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 592 0.5070 No
Pliant Corporation (2006) 03/12/2005 03/01/2006 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 777 No
Polymer Group, Inc. 15/03/2002 11/05/2002 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 1,232 No
PSINet 19/03/2001 31/05/2001 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  2,577 -0.9604 No
R.H. Donnelley Corporation 16/04/2009 28/05/2009 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 11,880 -0.9610 No
RCN Corporation 16/01/2004 27/05/2004 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  1,529 -0.9941 Yes
Redback Networks Inc. 07/07/2003 03/11/2003 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 661 -0.7813 No
Reliance Acceptance Group, Inc. 14/11/1997 09/02/1998 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 553 -0.9898 No
Remy International, Inc. 08/03/2007 08/10/2007 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  871 0.3677 No
Seitel Inc. 03/06/2002 06/06/2003 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 661 No
Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc. 01/01/2002 20/12/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 307 1.1126 No
Six Flags, Inc. 18/04/2009 13/06/2009 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 3,031 -0.1609 No
SLI, Inc. 23/04/2002 09/09/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 873 -0.9443 Yes
Solutia, Inc. 16/10/2003 17/12/2003 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  3,342 -0.7933 No
SpectraSite Holdings, Inc. 16/10/2002 15/11/2002 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  3,202 -0.7096 Yes
Spectrum Brands, Inc. 12/12/2008 03/02/2009 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  2,247 -0.5784 No
Station Casinos, Inc. 03/02/2009 28/07/2009 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 5,831 -0.8333 Yes
Team Financial, Inc. 08/09/2008 05/04/2009 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 825 0.0964 Yes
Teligent Inc 21/04/2001 21/05/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,209 0.0342 No
Thornburg Mortgage, Inc. 20/08/2008 01/05/2009 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 36,272 -0.9407 No
Transmeridian Exploration Incorporated 23/09/2008 20/03/2009 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 406 -0.6545 No
Trend-Lines, Inc. 12/06/2000 11/08/2000 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 209 -0.5763 No
Trenwick Group Ltd. 23/02/2003 20/08/2003 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 5,278 -0.7727 No
Trico Marine Services 27/04/2004 21/12/2004 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  585 -0.9702 No
Tronox Incorporated 28/10/2008 12/01/2009 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,723 -0.7288 No
Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. (2009) 19/12/2008 17/02/2009 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 2,231 -0.3154 Yes
UAL Corporation (United Airlines) 14/10/2002 09/12/2002 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  25,197 -0.7737 No
Vineyard National Bancorp 02/09/2008 21/07/2009 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 2,483 -0.8085 Yes
Visteon Corporation 30/05/2008 28/05/2009 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 7,205 -0.6543 No
Vlasic Foods International, Inc. 11/02/2000 29/01/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 665 -0.3287 Yes
Warnaco Group Inc. 12/05/2001 11/06/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 2,343 No
Waste Systems International, Inc. 05/07/2000 11/01/2001 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 255 -0.9353 No
WCI Communities, Inc. 08/12/2007 04/08/2008 Reported to be proposing exchange offer 3,832 -1.0000 No
WestPoint Stevens Inc. (2003) 16/04/2003 01/06/2003 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 1,297 -0.2941 Yes
Williams Communications Group, Inc. 04/03/2002 22/04/2002 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  5,992 -0.9045 No
Worldcom, Inc. 09/05/2002 21/07/2002 Received waiver/amendment. Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks 103,914 -0.9138 No
XO Communications, Inc. 04/10/2001 17/06/2002 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  7,930 -0.8216 No
Zenith Electronics Corp. 10/08/1998 23/08/1999 Reported to be engaged in restructuring talks  528 -0.9807 No
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Appendix B: Possible empty creditor cases 
 
Source: Bolton and Oehmke (2010) 
Company Year Summary Outcome
Marconi 2001-2002 Marconi was initially unable to renegotiate with a consortium of banks, some of which had 
bought credit protection. Ultimately a debt-for-equity swap was approved, which essentially 
wiped out equity holders.  
Out-of-court restructuring
Mirant 2003 Unable to work out a deal with its creditors, Mirant Corporation, an energy company based in 
Atlanta, was forced to file for Chapter 11. The bankruptcy judge appointed a committee 
representing the interests of equity holders, indicating that there was a reasonable chance that 
the reorganization value would be high enough to give equity holders a positive claim after 
paying off all creditors. 
Chapter 11
Tower Automotive 2004 A number of hedge funds refused to make concessions on exiting loans to enable new loans 
that would have improved Tower's cash position. Supposedly the hedge funds had shorted 
Tower's stock rather than having entered into a CDS position, to similar effect. 
Chapter 11
Six Flags 2009 Filed for Chapter 11 after failing to reach a deal with its creditors. Chapter 11
Lyondell Basell 2009 Filed for Chapter 11 after failing to reach a deal with its creditors. Chapter 11
General Growth Properties 2009 Filed for Chapter 11 after failing to reach a deal with its creditors. Chapter 11
Abitibi Bowater 2009 Filed for Chapter 11 after failing to reach a deal with its creditors. Chapter 11
Harrah's Entertainment 2009 Harrah's barely managed to renegotiate its debt. Out-of-court restructuring
Unisys 2009 After two failed exchange offers, the IT provider Unisys had to offer creditors bonds worth 
more than par to reschedule its 2010 debt. 
Out-of-court restructuring
GM 2009 Filed for Chapter 11 after failing to reach a deal with its creditors. Chapter 11
Chrysler 2009 Filed for Chapter 11 after failing to reach a deal with its creditors. Chapter 11
YRC Wordwide 2009-2010 The trucking company YRC only managed to renegotiate its debt at the last minute, when the 
Teamsters union threatened to protest in front of the offices of hedge funds which blocked 
YRC's debt-for-equity offer. 
Out-of-court restructuring
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Appendix C: Stock performance measures 
 
Source: The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
Mean Median Min. Max. Mean Median Min. Max.
Prior 3-year accumulated common stock return
  (i) Unadjusted returns (%) -45.9% -67.5% -98.1% 729.9% -55.1% -74.6% -100.0% 210.4% 0.7255 0.3360 0.2270
  (ii) Abnormal returns (%) -56.9% -90.1% -100.0% 478.6% -85.4% -97.6% -100.0% 66.2% 0.0001 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 ***
Prior 2-year accumulated common stock return
  (i) Unadjusted returns (%) -41.9% -41.9% -41.9% -41.9% -55.2% -55.2% -55.2% -55.2% 0.6228 0.7740 0.1053
  (ii) Abnormal returns (%) -39.6% -86.4% -100.0% 428.7% -79.8% -95.4% -100.0% 169.6% 0.0001 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0003 ***
Prior 1-year accumulated common stock return
  (i) Unadjusted returns (%) -46.4% -46.4% -46.4% -46.4% -51.6% -51.6% -51.6% -51.6% 0.6073 0.6710 0.1469
  (ii) Abnormal returns (%) 8.7% -63.7% -99.0% 2463.9% -70.8% -90.3% -100.0% 169.1% 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0038 ***
Estimated beta (β)
  3 to 5 years prior 0.98 0.86 -0.19 2.94 1.02 0.82 -0.01 5.41 0.4305 0.8830 0.3282
  1 to 5 years prior 1.11 1.00 -0.12 3.10 1.07 1.02 -0.38 3.10 0.7481 0.7770 0.6498
Yearly stock return volatility
  3 to 5 years prior 45.4% 44.8% 4.2% 112.0% 51.0% 46.9% 15.1% 158.5% 0.1719 0.3690 0.0555 *
  1 to 5 years prior 51.3% 48.4% 15.8% 121.6% 57.6% 54.3% 19.5% 124.0% 0.0455 ** 0.0250 ** 0.0261 **
  1 year prior 78.1% 67.2% 23.3% 201.5% 87.6% 80.8% 20.6% 246.6% 0.1028 0.0280 ** 0.0503 *
  2 years prior 70.4% 64.0% 20.7% 148.4% 77.3% 75.6% 6.8% 176.7% 0.1225 0.1790 0.0613 *
  3 years prior 65.2% 60.0% 19.2% 131.3% 71.9% 69.9% 6.3% 145.7% 0.0618 * 0.0140 ** 0.0431 **
  4 years prior 62.4% 58.4% 21.3% 131.3% 69.1% 66.5% 21.9% 131.3% 0.0391 ** 0.0050 *** 0.0285 **
  5 years prior 60.9% 57.5% 21.8% 131.3% 67.1% 66.2% 22.1% 130.5% 0.0496 ** 0.0050 *** 0.0388 **
  6 years prior 60.4% 56.5% 21.8% 131.3% 65.2% 65.3% 22.8% 130.5% 0.0581 * 0.0250 ** 0.0584 *
(* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
Mean
One-tailed      
t-test86 succsessful restructurings 132 unsuccsessful restructurings
Wilcoxon rank-sum test           
(p-value of z test)
Mean Median
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Appendix D: Two-stage instrumental variable estimation 
 
Two-stage instrumental variable (IV) regressions where each of the potentially endogenous variables from the structural model (Model 4 in Table 12) is estimated in separate 
reduced-form models using a selection of instrument variables and exogenous variables from the original model. As instruments we have used sector dummies for the sectors 
Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, and Information Technology, classified by the two first digits in the firms’ GICS code obtained from the Compustat database; age of the 
firm, defined as time since IPO or major merger obtained from the LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Database and various other news sources; total capital, defined as book value of 
common stock, preferred equity, and long-term debt, two years prior to the first mention date from the Compustat database; as well as leverage, defined as the book value 
of long-term debt over total capital, two years prior to the first mention date from the Compustat database. 
Source:  The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), EDGAR (SEC) Database,  Lynn M. LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, Standard & Poor’s Compustat Database, Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value dF/dx p-value
Industrials 0.224 (0.147) -0.124 (0.787) -0.031 (0.282) -0.215 (0.859) 0.074 (0.892)
Consumer Discretionary 0.138 (0.637) -0.142 (0.698) 0.004 (0.753) -0.828 (0.718) 0.396 (0.700)
Information Technology -0.124 (0.500) 0.170 (0.796) 0.076 (0.869) 2.102 (0.148) 0.504 (0.439)
Age -0.002 (0.940) 0.000 (0.944) 0.000 (0.414) -0.008 (0.705) -0.040 (0.000) ***
Total capital (2 years) 0.000 (0.910) 0.000 (0.066) * 0.000 (0.012) ** 0.000 (0.521) 0.000 (0.004) ***
Leverage (2 years) 0.273 (0.011) ** 0.186 (0.245) -0.053 0.000 *** -1.247 (0.137) 0.807 (0.033) **
Year -0.007 (0.657) 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.026 (0.822) -0.041 (0.431) 0.077 (0.181)
Liabilities/Assets -0.049 (0.976)
Public/Liabilities 0.103 (0.948)
Accountspay./Liabilities 2.473 (0.762)
Numberofprivate./Liabilities 0.442 (0.315)
P/B EV (2-year average) 0.393 (0.086)
Constant 13.97 (0.639) -7.64 (0.678) -7.25 (0.744) 54.49 (0.816) 84.51 (0.422)
N 170 170 170 170 170 170
R2 0.0719 0.1595 0.0738 0.0399 0.1996
F 1.79 (0.092) * 4.39 (0.000) *** 1.84 (0.082) * 0.96 (0.462) 5.77 (0.000) ***
(* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) Wald test of exogeneity, χ2(5) = 2.44 (p-value 0.7849)
  Overidentification test, χ2(1) = 0.108 (p-value 0.7424)
P/B EV Out-of-court
Reduced-form models Structural model
Liabilities/Assets Public/Liabilities Accounts./Liabilities #Private/Liab.
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